Species justice and harm to animals - Environmental Harm: An Eco-justice Perspective - page 104

the use of animals, and that the status quo requires revolutionary
transformation if animals are to be liberated.
Legal definitions of animals vary greatly (see Beirne, 2009), but most
reflect anthropocentric conceptions of what it is to be an animal and
most categorise animals according to presumed human-related uses
and purposes. Across the Australian jurisdictions, for example, which
includes six states, two territories and federal government, various
legislation guides human-animal interaction (Gullone and Clarke,
2010; Sankoff and White, 2008). Embedded within these laws are
conceptions of animals based upon physiological characteristics (for
example, a live member of the vertebrate species, which includes
amphibians, reptiles, birds and mammals, and which includes, in some
states, fish and crustaceans) and/or human-related constructions of use
(for example, domesticated farm animals, animals used for recreational
purposes and animals used in research and educational institutions).
Defining animals has generally started from a human-centred basis
even where the intent of discussion is to address issues of speciesism
and animal rights. Thus, for example, key writers in this area (such as
Singer, 1994; Regan, 1985) use the phrase 'nonhuman animals' which
reproduces to some extent the very duality they wish to overcome.
Animals other than humans, it is argued, should not be defined through
a human negation, but rather in terminology such as 'humans and other
animals' (see Cazaux, 1999). Be this as it may, for pragmatic reasons
authors such as Beirne (2007, 2009) and Sollund (2008, 2011) have
adopted the shorter version after contexualising its meaning and usage
via preliminary comment. In part the resistance to such a phrase is due
to the idea that it reproduces the dichotomy of humans as opposed to
animals (and thereby diminishes thought of the similarities between
them, or establishing nonhuman yardsticks by which to judge and
value what is different or dissimilar). However, as seen below, where to
'draw the line' is of perennial and considerable importance to questions
surrounding species justice and matters of harm pertaining to animals.
Animal cruelty is also variously defined depending upon the
jurisdiction. It can also vary depending upon the 'use' context within
which the animal is located, as certain types of cruel activity may be
accepted in some situations (for example, killing of farmed animals for
food). In many cases animal cruelty is described through a list of acts of
omission or commission rather than through a specific legal definition
of cruelty. In South Australia, for example, cruelty is defined in these
terms (Gullone and Clarke, 2010: 306):