Producing Radiation Maps - Participatory Mapping: New Data, New Cartography - page 106

Beyond the mistrust for official sources, many
participants stress the need to expand the number of data
sources to facilitate cross-checking. Another radiation
mapmaker, claims that it is necessary to include non-official
data to prevent the government from withholding

compromising elements:

People do not trust official data from Japanese
government. We need real time data from various
sources including Japanese government and non-
official data. If we don't have non-official data,
government can cover up on government data.
[ sic ]

Later, the same person claimed to use the government
data - the map by the Spurs agency shows all the feeds from
the Pachube platform, the official ones as well as the
non-official ones - and to trust their validity. He even pushed
his neutrality to the point of treating official and alternative
data sources equally: “We trust it. But one of the various. We
trust non-official data as much as official data” [ sic ]. The
pragmatism of cartographers in emergency situations is
illustrated by their neutral stance to the data.

Akiba, a member of Tokyo Hackerspace and designer of
Safecast's measurement devices, stresses the need to verify
official

data, which requires alternative projects - he

mentions Geiger Maps and Safecast (previously RDTN):

Yeah, I think independent corroboration is really
useful. I like Geiger maps and also RDTN.org.
The more info you have, the easier it is to make
an informed decision. I think having less
information is what leads to panic because people