Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
The discussion in Box 17.1 indicates there is a difference between what is rational
economically and what is rational in energy terms (cf. Dryzek, 1987). This differ-
ence points to the very calculus Marx argued was distinctive about capitalism in
the fi rst place: it aims to increase value, even when there are diminishing returns in
other arenas. Capitalism will notice a decreasing reserve in its resource base only if
value decreases. If not, these two spheres are free (for a time) to move in opposite
directions. It seems then that while it is important simultaneously to theorise value
and the matter through which it materialises, they are not reducible to each other
as the same thing. As to the prospects of other energy sources, none compare to the
(dis)advantages of fossil energy, Altvater argues. For example, 'today, and possibly
forever, it is impossible to power the machine of capitalist accumulation and growth
with 'thin' solar radiation-energy. It simply lacks the advantages mentioned above,
i.e., the potential of time and space compression, which 'thick' fossil energy offers'
(Altvater, 2006, p. 45). Fossil energy as useful as it has been is an obstacle to future
development, as capitalism understands that term 'development'. Fossil energy's
supply is limited; its harmful ecological effects too severe. Political machination, oil
wars, and new oil discoveries only forestall the day when fossil capitalism will come
to a close. How close we are to that day is subject to intense debate. For example,
Marxists such as Michael Watts disagree that the recent Iraq Wars are essentially
'oil wars' announcing the approach of peak oil production. Nor are periods of sup-
posed oil shortage in the 20th century premonitory: 20th-century capitalism's
problem was rather one of oil glut and declining prices (Retort, 2006). Marxists
such as Daniel Buck (2006), following Storper and Walker (1989) warn against
making oil and capitalism synonymous with each other: oil is just one kind of energy
framework for capitalism; it will be followed by others.
Where does Marx stand on all this? On the one hand, it seems he was less
concerned with environmental problems as we now understand them (e.g., ecolo-
gical destruction, pollution, and so on); his concern was reserved more for what
happens in the human world under capitalism than the non-human world, although
this cannot be known for certain given the little he said and the openness with
which he said it (Soper, 1996). On the other hand, as we go about construing the
congruent relations between capital and the physical properties of the substances
it articulates with, the translation of purposes and ideas into material forms through
the labour process should
not
be made to seem too smooth. This is a theme oddly
underdeveloped by Altvater. 'Energy invested' does not automatically fi nd its mark,
even under high EROEI. Altvater skips over a long history of technological blunder
and serendipity at play in the fi elds of oil, blunder and serendipity that made
available the very properties of oil that are so 'congruent' with capital (Bowker,
1994; cf. Bakker and Bridge, 2006, p. 9; cf. Latour, 1993; cf. Braun, 2000). The
smooth translation of value through the circulatory, reproductive process of capital
is much belied by volume 2 of
Capital,
an indication of Marx's dialectical method:
begin with inadequate concepts and serially refi ne them by charting what other
concepts (e.g., mismatches of supply and demand, over-investments of capital, etc.)
they bump into (see Harvey, 1982; Castree, 1996; Arthur, 2002; Henderson,
2004).
Some telling questions are now out of the bag: if buildings exist in the heads of
architects (or oil derricks and drills in the heads of engineers), does this mean that
non-human actors nowhere intervene, interrupt, cause adaptation and revision, to
say nothing of plain old failed attempts to control nature? And if the non-human
