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processes whose complexity means that
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determining what damage may
.
34
Applying these restrictions to questions concerning the appropriate-
ness of action to protect ecosystems provides a good illustration of
the problems that they may generate. We know that the stresses which
human activities place on ecosystems do erode their resilience and leave
them vulnerable to events that may trigger a change in state, but it is
often the case that we are not aware of this erosion or that a change in
state is a possible outcome until after a regime shift has occurred. Even
on an ex post analysis, we may not be able to identify with con
be anticipated is always a gamble
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dence
the causes of change. The principle as it is currently constituted may not
require action in respect of these threats because of the extreme dif
culty
with identifying the causal pathways by which they arise in systems whose
complexity is beyond our current understanding. However, this would
clearly be an unsatisfactory outcome in view of the possible consequen-
ces of ecosystem failure for our own well-being. In addition, factors that
leave ecosystems more exposed to regime change without presenting an
obvious risk of triggering this may not be regarded as presenting threats
of signi
cant damage themselves although they increase the likelihood
that a highly undesirable situation will occur. However, bolstering the
resilience of ecosystems should (as argued in
Chapter 2
)providethe
focal point for legal regimes that seek to prevent ecological degradation.
This conclusion suggests that the precautionary principle and notions
of environmental damage on which it rests are ill-suited for ecological
governance because this demands a proactive approach to reducing risks
that harm will occur.
In view of these considerations, I suggest that a different conception
of precaution is required for controlling the potential, but highly uncer-
tain, effects of activities on ecosystem functionality. This would require
that precautionary action be taken as a matter of course and despite
an inability to point to clear risks of harm in particular circumstances.
When confronted with the possibility that risks of
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poorly known
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but
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occurring may be exacerbated by our own actions, a
rational response would, as Sluijs and Turkenburg argue in the context of
climate change, be to form precautionary strategies which seek, as far as
possible, to reduce risks that the feared event will occur.
35
high-impact events
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34
Ibid
., p. 166.
35
J. van der Sluijs and W. Turkenburg,
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in E. Fisher, J. Jones, and R. von Schomberg (eds) Implementing the Precautionary
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ClimateChangeandthePrecautionaryPrinciple
