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inevitably makes protection of the environment contingent on other
human values not taking precedence.
122
This objection is based on an
assumption that an ethic which is human-centred is synonymous with
onethatholdsonlyinstrumentalvalueinnature.However,thereisno
reason why an anthropocentric position should automatically lead to
such a valuation. Indeed, I suggest that an altered perspective would
result in a valuation of nature not simply for what we can extract from it,
but for its existence. The health of ecosystems should be seen as being of
supervening value because what is valuable for our existence ultimately
derives from their continued functionality.
In this regard, Callicott provides a useful analogy between the con-
dition of ecosystems and our own health.
123
Thelatterissomethingwe
value, in the
rst instance, for its own existence. In the same way the health
of ecosystems is something that we should value because it provides a cradle
and support mechanism for our survival as a species.
124
In both cases,
'
also has instrumental value in that it enables us to pursue our own
ends.
125
However, consciousness of its importance for this secondary value
to be realised establishes, in principle at least, a clear hierarchy between the
valuations.
A perspective of humanity as one element within complex larger
dynamic ecological and physical systems, whose well-being is essential
for our own, advocates that we should hold value in the continued
functionality of the systems of which we form part. However, what is it
about ecosystems that we should value and seek to preserve in the ethical
positions we adopt? It is not simply the existence of ecosystems that is
valuable to us. Indeed, valuing ecosystems as if they were clearly distinct
entities is recognised to present dif
health
'
culties because of their lack of
ned spatial boundaries.
126
A better focus is on the processes,
properties and resilience that contribute to, and maintain, the ecological
functions from which we derive bene
well-de
t. Norton concurs with this view
in arguing that true value is to be found in
and in the
processes that sustain the species and the elements that exist currently
'
nature
'
s creativity
'
122
Wilkinson,
'
Using Environmental Ethics
'
,p.19.
123
J. B. Callicott,
in J. B. Callicott (ed.)
Beyond the Land Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1999), pp. 334
'
Aldo Leopold
'
s Concept of Ecosystem Health
'
-
5.
124
J. B. Callicott,
in J. B. Callicott (ed.) Beyond the Land
Ethic: More Essays in Environmental Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 1999), p. 355.
'
The Value of Ecosystem Health
'
125
126
Callicott,
Ibid
.
'
The Value of Ecosystem Health
'
, pp. 348
-
9.
