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statutory objective and principles. The body would not have the author-
ity to reject proposed policy if, in its view, it falls short of what might be
achieved once the need to allow for economic and social adaptation has
been taken into account. It would not be appropriate for an unelected
organisation to have the
nal say over decisions that would be of great
consequence for society as a whole. 154 Rather, its role would be to give
the government advice on whether the statutory objective and principles
have been observed and, if not, of the changes that should be made to
draft policies so that they meet the requirements of the framework.
This advice and the government
s response recording its acceptance
of, or reasons for rejecting, recommendations would be published. This
transparency would provide an incentive for the government to provide
reasoned justi
'
cation for the conclusions it reaches as to how ecological
risks can be reduced over different timescales. It would also provide an
incentive for the government to take its statutory duties seriously by
providing a possible basis for judicial scrutiny of a decision to reject
advice given by the independent agency. Analysis of the advisory role
of the Committee on Climate Change under the UK
'
sClimateChange
Act 2008 casts doubt on whether the UK
'
s courts would be willing to
interfere with the government
s decisions in complex policy areas such
as identifying effective means for progressing the transition to a low
carbon economy. 155 However, McHarg suggests that they may be more
prepared to make mandatory orders compelling compliance by the
government with its duties where a public advisory body has issued a
clear recommendation that a course of action should or should not be
pursued. 156 Clarity in the wording of the government
'
s statutory duty to
take into account and respond to guidance would further enhance the
in
'
s reviewing role by strengthening the grounds for
judicial intervention. For example, a requirement that the government,
if it rejects advice, should not only provide reasons for doing so, but
also explain why its chosen approach would better advance the statutory
objective than that which it rejects would concentrate governmental
uence of the body
'
154 A. McHarg,
'
(2011) 2 Climate Law, 483 makes a similar observation with regard to the acquisition of
executive powers by the Committee on Climate Change under the UK
'
Climate Change Constitutionalism? Lessons from the United Kingdom
'
sClimate
Change Act 2008 in addition to its advisory remit.
155 M. Stallworthy,
'
Legislating against Climate Change: A UK Perspective on a Sisyphean
Challenge
'
(2009) 72 The Modern Law Review, 423
-
7; McHarg,
'
Climate Change
Constitutionalism
'
,477
-
8.
156 McHarg,
'
ClimateChangeConstitutionalism
'
, 479.
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