Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
because of the approaching Christmas holiday, only
8 per cent of the population was aware of the cyclone.
About 30 per cent of residents took no precautions to
prepare for the storm's arrival; fewer than 20 per cent
believed that people took the cyclone warnings seri-
ously; and 80 per cent of residents later complained that
they had not been given enough warning. Fortunately,
Australia had established a disaster coordination center
that, depending on the severity of the disaster, could
respond in varying degrees to any event. The director
of this center, once requested to take charge, could
adopt dictatorial powers and even override federal
government or judicial decisions. This organization
responded immediately to Cyclone Tracy. Within
24 hours, communications had been re-established with
the city even though it was the height of the Christmas
vacation season. Major-General Stretton, the head of the
National Disasters Organisation, reached Darwin within
24 hours on a military aircraft with emergency supplies
loaded at Sydney and Mt Isa. Stretton took total control
of Darwin and made the decision to evacuate non-
essential residents because of the serious threat to
health. The cyclone destroyed 37 per cent of homes and
severely damaged most of the remainder (Figure 3.9).
There was no shelter, water, power, or sanitation. Within
a few days, most of the food in deep-freezers began to
decay, so that a stench of rotten meat hung over the city.
Stray cats and dogs were shot and special army teams
were organized to clean up rotten food. In addition, the
decision was made to facilitate evacuation to permit
orderly and manageable rebuilding. Commercial planes
were commandeered for the evacuation and details
taken of all vehicles leaving Darwin by road. Volunteer
emergency relief organizations ensured that all evacuees
had food, adequate transport, accommodation, and
money. The response in the first week was efficiently
organized and carried out.
In the medium term, the evacuation caused more
problems than it solved. A major problem was the fact
that, while residents were efficiently and safely evacu-
ated, no register of their whereabouts was established.
Over 25 000 people were flown out, mainly to southern
cities of their choice 3000-4000 km away. Communi-
cation with, and among, evacuees became impossible.
Hence, there was no way to contact people personally
after the cyclone to assist them with adjustment to
new circumstances. Residents who stayed in Darwin
suffered the least, while those who did not return in
the medium term suffered the most. Non-returned
Fig. 3.9 Effects of wind damage caused by Cyclone Tracy striking
Darwin, Australia, 25 December 1974.
A)
High winds in excess of 217 km hr -1 tended to detach
outside walls from the floor, leaving only the inner
framework surrounding the bathroom.
Fig. 3.9 B)
In extreme cases, the high winds progressively peeled off
the complete building, leaving only the iron floor beams
and support pillars. (Photographs courtesy of Assoc. Prof.
Geoff Boughton, TimberED Services Pty Ltd., Glengarry,
Western Australia.)
evacuees reported greater negative changes in lifestyle.
These people also tended to be disadvantaged by the
storm. They were more likely not to have insured
houses for cyclone damage and more likely to have
suffered total property loss. They ended up with less
income after the event and suffered the greatest stress.
While the stress may have existed beforehand or
been exacerbated by the disaster, the difference
between this group and the others was striking. Both
psychosomatic illness and family problems increased
significantly for non-returnees. The evacuation rein-
forced and increased the levels of stress and anxiety
residents were experiencing because of their con-
frontation with Cyclone Tracy. Some of the stress was a
consequence of the dictatorial powers assumed after
 
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