Framing Climate Change Implications for Infrastructures and Urban Systems - Climate Change and Infrastructure, Urban Systems, and Vulnerabilities - page 36

Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems (SCADA) that depend on an undis-
rupted data and information networks (Energy Sector Control Systems Working Group,
2011; Water Sector Coordinating Council Cyber Security Working Group, 2008).
As illustrated by the examples of the 2011 San Diego Blackout, the 2003 Northeast
Blackout, (US Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004), and Hurricane Irene
(Wheeler, et al., 2011), the greatest losses may be distant from the infrastructure where
damages started. For example, Hurricane Katrina disrupted oil terminal operations in
South Louisiana, not because of direct damage to port facilities, but because workers
could not reach work locations through surface transportation routes and could not be
housed locally because of disruption to potable water, housing, and food shipments
(Myers, 2008).
As illustrated by a Miami case study (section IV D below), interdependent infra-
structure cascades occur when failures of components within one infrastructure trigger
failures in other, interconnected infrastructures (Brown, et al., 2004). These cascading
failures can be either caused or aggravated by regional convergence (which refers to
collective business decisions concentrating important infrastructure in small geographic
areas or corridors) (DEFRA, 2011). Regional convergence is likely to place more infra-
structure assets at or near climate-sensitive environmental features that are particularly
sensitive to water availability, water quality, and direct damage from floods, wind and
precipitation (Titus and Richman, 2001), suggesting that some separation might be a risk
management strategy for the future. The case studies within this assessment showed
examples of the close coupling of the direct damages within the power infrastructure
cascading to degrade water quality and availability and the resulting difficulties that
communities experience in recovering from these events. Power outages lasting more
than 12 hours usually result in raw sewage spills degrading coastline water resources
and cause loss of water pressure resulting in water supply contamination. These infra-
structures placed in environmentally sensitive areas also experience constraints adopt-
ing adaptation strategies that require new infrastructure construction or reconfiguration
(Titus and Richman, 2001).
As mentioned above, in the 2001 Baltimore Howard Street Tunnel Fire tunnel, a
particular, focused disruptive event, not only re-routed truck traffic around Chesapeake
Bay but destroyed co-located fiber optic communication cables, causing wide ranging
slow-downs and congestion within data and information networks nation-wide. In the
movement of key infrastructure to Southwest Florida in the event of sea level rise, re-
gional convergence focuses on points where many important systems link, with sig-
nificant consequences for other areas of the country in the event of an extreme weather
event (Curtis and Schneider, 2011; Federal Railroad Administration, 2005).
Particular infrastructure vulnerabilities
Experience with extreme weather events in the US shows that infrastructures are par-
ticularly vulnerable to such events if they are located in areas exposed to such events;
they are located at or near especially climate-sensitive environmental features such as
coastlines, rivers, storm tracks, and vegetation in arid areas; and/or they are already
stressed by age and by demand levels that exceed what they were designed to handle.
A number of federal initiatives have called for new investments in the US portfolio of
public infrastructures, recognizing that much of our infrastructure is aged and unable to