Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
•
Fluid Organizational Structures:
HRO structures are often adaptable and luid, allow-
ing the system to expand or contract in response to its environment (Roberts, 1990).
TWSs with lexible organizational structures would be able to expand and contract
resources in response to shifts and changes in environmental demands, disasters, or
periods of slack resources. In the event of a tsunami, TWS managers need to grow ef-
fective, functioning response organizations in a period of less than 24 hours, and then
adjust the organizational structures to the needs of the response (Tuler, 1988; Bigley
and Roberts, 2001). The ability to provide varied organizational structures in response
to environmental demands may be critical to the success of TWS organizations, similar
to the way ire and emergency organizations expand and contract in response to ire
demands (Grabowski and Roberts, 1999). Distributed information technology that
connects the system responders can provide the technological glue that ties HRO
members together, and luid organizational structures can allow the organization to
grow, expand, contract, and respond to changes in a dynamic, high tempo environ-
ment (Bigley and Roberts, 2001). Similar requirements for members and organizations
in TWSs can be envisioned as tsunami conditions unfold.
•
Strong Organizational Culture:
Schein (1992, 1996) deines “culture” as a set of basic
tacit assumptions, that a group of people share, about how the world is and ought to
be; it determines their perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and to some degree, their overt
behavior. In many organizations, shared assumptions typically form around the func-
tional units of the organization and are often based on members' similar educational
backgrounds or experiences (Grabowski and Roberts, 1996, 1997). HROs are character-
ized by strong cultures and norms that reinforce the organization's mission and goals
and that focus attention on procedures, policies, and reward structures consistent
with the organization's mission and safety (LaPorte and Consolini, 1991). HROs have
cultures attentive to errors; cultures where closely held ideas about the organization,
its mission, and member roles in reliability enhancement are articulated; cultures that
encourage learning; and cultures where safe areas—for decision making, communica-
tion, and the like—are created as buffers (Weick, 1993). Constructs such as oversight
and checks and balances reinforce the strong cultural norms of the HRO. Melding the
varied cultures that integrate the system into a cohesive whole can be extremely difi-
cult in distributed systems that are connected by linkages that can dissolve and wane
as requirements, organizational structures, and political will change (Weick, 1987;
Weick and Roberts, 1993; Grabowski and Roberts, 1999).
Managing decision making across organizations that report to different management
structures is a challenge for highly dispersed efforts; this is certainly the case with U.S. tsunami
detection, warning, and preparedness efforts. A particular challenge is that the federal govern-
ment has responsibility to forecast and warn about potential hazards, yet local governments
order evacuations. Failure to consider distributed decision making within groups and across
multiple units can lead to lack of readiness for the next large-scale catastrophe; e.g., Hurricane
Katrina (Roberts et al., 2005; Farber et al., 2006). Building good communication and trust aid in
