Geoscience Reference
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NOAA access to seismological expertise at this operational center run by the USGS
and would pair the critical assets of two agencies with complementary missions.
(2) Alternatively, because of issues arising from parallel or inconsistent procedures and
potential confusion in the public from different warning products from the two
centers, the committee suggests that a centrally managed center located in a single
geographic location (such as the Hurricane Center) is a potential solution to the incon-
sistency in methods, architecture, culture, and messages. A single center might also
allow limited resources to be pooled and might ease the dificulties in 24/7 stafing of
the centers.
There are many current examples of highly reliable, mission-critical, large-scale systems
that support real-time distributed operations using various organizational forms across a broad
geographical area. In the NOAA/NWS community, these include the NWS Hurricane Center, the
Severe Storm Lab, and the Storm Prediction Center at NCEP. There are other examples outside
NOAA including the seismic, oceanographic, meteorological, undersea, cyberspace, and space
systems communities, for example (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 2005;
National Science Foundation, 2006). Each of these HROs provide opportunities to leverage
lessons learned and best practices for distributed tsunami warning operations.
Recommendation:
Organizational structures for the two TWCs should be evaluated
and fully described as part of the enterprise-wise technology planning effort previously
described. Whether there should be a single or multiple TWCs, or whether the TWC
operations should be consolidated in a different location, should be addressed in the
enterprise-wide, long-range planning effort.
In evaluating the TWC organizational structure and locale(s), consideration should be
given to the proximity to the research community, its user community, and the vulnerability to
hazards. HROs achieve high levels of performance when their organizational structures support
the decision making, communications, organizational culture(s), and trust required for success,
and facilitate provision of the requisite information and knowledge sources to system users,
participants, and customers (Grabowski and Roberts, 1999; Bigley and Roberts, 2001). Although
developing a strong, uniied organizational culture in a warning system can be dificult when
members are geographically dispersed, (Grabowski et al., 2007), it is crucial in order to avoid
dysfunctionality and miscommunication (Porter, 1993; Stephenson, 1995).
CONCLUSIONS
Effective tsunami detection, warning, and preparedness require that multiple, distributed
tasks that are linked together to achieve the goal of reducing loss of life and economic assets
using common processes are supported by highly reliable, distributed information technology.
In a tsunami event, all of the distributed efforts must come together to produce an effective
response and function as if it were a single organization (Tuler, 1988; Bigley and Roberts, 2001).
