Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
TWCs, as IT software development and maintenance activities are collateral duties for scientiic
personnel and watchstanders, most of whom have formal training or education in geophysical
sciences, not software engineering. Despite this lack of formal education and/or training, IT
support, maintenance, and development of operational software consumes a signiicant por-
tion of a scientiic person's daily tasks.
Given these issues and the increasing prevalence of social networking and mobile tech-
nologies in emergency, crisis, and disaster management, messaging software that permits an
interface with the social media and compatibility with newer generation software and web
products/mobile interfaces (e.g., Extensible Markup Language (XML), Simple Messaging System
(SMS) formats) would provide several beneits (Sutton et al., 2008).
The committee reviewed the “canned messages” that are composed and delivered by the
TWCs and discovered that many documented principles for effective warning messages (see
Chapter 3 for detailed discussion) have not been applied. In addition, the generation of two
sets of warning products from the two TWCs can be a major source of confusion among the
emergency management community and the public as illustrated by the June 14 case study
(Appendix F). On June 14, 2005, after an earthquake within the Gorda Plate west of the north-
ern California and southern Oregon coast, the TWCs issued two different warning messages.
While the WC/ATWC issued a warning for its AOR, which included California and Oregon, the
PTWC subsequently issued a bulletin for its AOR (including Mexico) stating that there was no
tsunami warning in effect (for its AOR). Both messages were correctly stating the threat of their
respective AORs, but they led local oficials to believe that the PTWC message canceled the
previous message from the WC/ATWC; thus, reducing the effectiveness of the message. This is
of particular concern in areas where the separation in AOR is not intuitive. For example, if an
earthquake with the potential to generate a tsunami occurs in the Caribbean, the WC/ATWC
would issue a message for Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, while the PTWC would issue
a notiication for the rest of the Caribbean. Similarly, after a major earthquake in the Paciic,
the WC/ATWC issues a warning message for Alaska, the Canadian Paciic coast, Washington,
Oregon, and California, but not Mexico or Hawaii.
Although these messages are not intended to replace messages from local/state oficials
to the public with instructions about appropriate response actions, products from both the
TWCs are distributed to members of the public via the internet, social networking tools, or the
media (TV and radio) in addition to the other oficial channels (see Chapter 3 for details). Con-
sequently, the messages are immediately disseminated to the public via multiple and diverse
channels—as was the case during the Samoan tsunami (Appendix I) and the Chilean tsunami
(Appendix J). Obtaining messages from multiple channels is positively correlated with protec-
tive action taking, if the messages are consistent. Inconsistencies in message content create the
potential for confusion and can result in greater uncertainty about protective actions needed.
Therefore, it is central to the success of the TWCs that they further improve the consistency
and clarity between their messages to prevent any confusion resulting from the distinct AOR.
Alternatively, the issuance of a single message after internal consultation between the TWCs
ought to be considered.
