Geoscience Reference
In-Depth Information
BOX 3.4
Evaluation of a TsunamiReady Community's Response to a Tsunami
The primary missions of the TsunamiReady program are to educate at-risk individuals on
what to do when a tsunami warning is issued and to mitigate, if possible, potential losses. Evalu-
ating the effectiveness of the program is dificult, given the infrequency of tsunami warnings.
Therefore, as a case study to provide insight on the program (as opposed to a full evaluation),
the committee reviewed the actions taken in the community of Crescent City, California, a rec-
ognized TsunamiReady community during two tsunami events—the June 14, 2005, tsunami
(which originated offshore Crescent City within the Gorda Plate) and the November 15, 2006,
tsunami (which originated in Russia's Kuril Islands) (based on a California Emergency Manage-
ment Agency [CalEMA] internal action report). Both events illustrate the limited effectiveness
and challenges of the current TsunamiReady program.
Crescent City was no stranger to tsunamis when it received warnings in 2005 and 2006.
The1964 Good Friday earthquake and tsunami in Alaska inundated Crescent City harbor and
parts of its business district, resulting in extensive damage and the loss of lives. After the 1991
Petrolia, California, earthquake, a focused study of tsunami potential and preparedness centered
in Humboldt and Del Norte Counties, where Crescent City is located. Extensive media coverage
of the earthquake and tsunami threat resulted in funding a public education and preparedness
campaign and developing an earthquake/tsunami scenario to support state and local emergency
planning efforts.The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) provided funding to prepare
public information brochures and to make improvements to the local siren warning systems. The
designation of Crescent City as TsunamiReady was a direct result of the heightened awareness
and commitment of the community in preparing for a tsunami.
Observations of the 2005 and 2006 tsunami events suggest the community has more work
to do with regard to community education and mitigation (Table 3.1). During the 2005 event,
there were spontaneous car-based evacuations by the public
into
areas of potential inundation,
and some overwhelmed dispatch ofices failed to follow notiication procedures. In 2006, alert
and warning procedures were followed, but extensive damage was incurred because of deferred
maintenance of port facilities. Despite its TsunamiReady recognition, the community observed
signiicant weaknesses in its ability to effectively respond to tsunamis during the 2005 and 2006
tsunamis. As is likely the case in all communities, sustaining public awareness and maintaining
this knowledge of evacuation procedures is a signiicant challenge for local oficials.
Effectiveness.
There are no assessments of the effectiveness of the prescriptive readiness
actions, the sustainability of the readiness capabilities at the local level, or whether mitigation
actions reduce exposure to losses. The program does not identify baselines against which to
assess progress other than a count of the number of recognized communities. Additionally,
there has not been an assessment of how TsunamiReady communities have performed in
actual events or if the criteria used in the program relate to performance.
