Civil Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
2). The recommendations considered are likely to need
discussing with the manager responsible to achieve the
initial risk reduction measures.
The health and safety/fi re safety arrangements
section in the policy will need to refl ect the storage, use,
handling, disposal, etc. of the aerosols and the provision
of adequate levels of supervision and training will also
need to be addressed.
Ideally, each of these areas will address the need
to reduce the quantity of aerosols being stored to an
absolute minimum (perhaps making arrangements for
'daily call-off' from the supplier). While it is appreciated
that some of the controls will require immediate action
the policy and procedures will take a number of months
to complete; raising awareness of staff and reducing the
stock levels must be seen as a priority in the short term
and the recommended risk controls refl ect this.
Given that the only existing control measures
(wooden doors, some of which were secured and
signed, together with a policy on who could gain access)
were inadequate the hazard of a fi re starting within the
service riser would likely present a signifi cant risk of
smoke spread throughout the building placing anyone in
the building at risk.
The recommendations arising from the fi ndings
would therefore relate to the provision of intumescent
strips and where appropriate cold smoke seals, to bring
the service riser doors/door sets up to British Standard
476 (Priority 3).
Consideration may also be given to the provision
of fi re stopping (intumescent cushions, pillows, etc.)
between each fl oor within the service risers (Priority 3).
The initial steps (Priority 1) would also be to secure
all the doors to the service risers and remind the
management team to monitor this issue.
A further recommendation may be to review the
policy and arrangements for the management of fi re to
include a monthly inspection/safety tour programme
(Priority 3/4).
On occasions a number of controls may need to be
cross-referenced such as the provision of automatic fi re
detection linked to the existing fi re alarm system, which
may also be recommended within the service riser units.
The existing control measures identifi ed in the above
example have already reduced the risk signifi cantly (low
level); people are provided with a warning in the event
of fi re and they should be able to hear or know when to
respond in the event of an emergency.
It is likely that the risk assessor (risk assessment
team) will have been provided with a large number of
supporting documents, the majority of which are detailed
earlier within this chapter. It would appear from the
example that the only issue to deal with is the obstruction
of an alarm sounder which can be addressed immedi-
ately by the removal of the obstruction. To support this
Figure 14.4
Aerosol container
noted that fi re fi ghters not expecting the volume of storage
of aerosols may be placed at risk should a fi re occur.
The immediate actions that could be taken were to
remove a large proportion of the aerosol containers from
within the building to a secure metal store outside the
building (Priority 1). If no such facility exists it would be
recommended that an approved metal storage cabinet
be provided (Priority 2). As an interim measure it may be
possible to store the aerosols within metal cabinets in
another storage area where there is limited ignition and
other fuel sources or alternatively remove the ignition
and fuel sources from the current storage area (Priority
Worked example 2 - Sources of fuel that
may assist fi re growth
An employer (responsible person) is operat-
ing a small service department for mechan-
ical and electrical equipment. They use a
variety of different chemicals, a number of
which are of an aerosol container type.
They purchase the materials through their
authorised dealership and keep the aerosols
boxed up in their original containers within a
storeroom which is being used to store a range
of materials including posters, brochures, etc.
Other than the receipts there is no docu-
mentation relating to the management of
these highly fl ammable aerosol units. It was
noted during the visual element of the fi re
risk assessment that some eight to ten boxes
each containing a dozen 300 ml aerosols were
being stored.
