Biomedical Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
Although there have been some spirited rearguard actions, few com-
mentators now regard the creation of a child by artificial insemination
or in vitro fertilization as unnatural in any sense that would make
it morally objectionable or problematic.
30
The most forceful recent
critiques of assisted reproductive technology have come from feminists
and other writers who fear that these technologies will commodify
children and subordinate women.
31
Feminist critiques rarely invoke
nature except to debunk the supposition that females are somehow
more nature's creatures than are men. Nevertheless, critiques of the so-
called industrialization of reproduction have important affinities with
theological concerns about the displacement of natural objects and
processes.
32
The distinction and tension between the notions of
producing
and
pro-
creating
children arose long before the advent of genetic engineering.
Indeed, as William Ruddick observes, both notions have shaped our
traditional thinking about natural, or species-typical, reproduction.
Ruddick suggests that folk wisdom regards parents as gardeners, delib-
erately making a product from the material that nature provides them.
Folk wisdom also regards them as guardians, deputized to nurture and
protect an independent being. Ruddick suggests that both notions, or
analogies, are needed to capture the parental role, which involves the
production of a being that becomes the moral equal of its producers,
and which places special obligations on the parents by virtue of their
productive efforts.
33
One might suggest that in Ruddick's terms the delicate balance
between the two aspects of reproduction is upset by genetic technology,
so that the productive aspect overwhelms the procreative. There are at
least two ways in which genetic engineering might threaten the balance.
The first is by conferring an unprecedented degree of control and selec-
tivity on “gardeners,” who no longer need to rely on the vagaries of
genetic recombination. They can pick the genes, or at least some of
the genes, that they want, and thereby increase their control over the
final product. The child is not only produced but manufactured; he or
she is not merely a product but an artifact. It might be argued, though,
that this threat is greatly exaggerated, reflecting a naive and over-
simplified view of the contribution of genes to valued traits. Genetic
engineering will always leave a great deal to chance and the environ-
