Biomedical Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
All of this is highly relevant to the issue at hand. For what counts as
genetic
disease is also subject to sociovaluational designation. Just as
obesity became a disease rather than a cause thereof, so too could short-
ness of stature or slightness of build in men, or stubbiness in women, or
an IQ below 140 in children. People could then demand that such poten-
tial “diseases” be treated at the genomic level by genetic engineering.
This is indeed a real possibility, which could in turn lead both to a
major expenditure of resources to develop ways of “fixing” things, like
body type, that we are not inclined to now think of as diseases and to
uniformity in the population. To the first concern, it suffices to say we
are already diverting medical money and effort into modalities like breast
augmentation and gluteus reduction that are largely based on (histori-
cally and culturally) mercurial aesthetic values. We cannot stop wealthy
people from underwriting such work. The uniformity argument is of less
concern, as different people will, I suspect, always value different things,
and even if most want tall progeny, some will inevitably want short ones.
I think we can reach social agreement that the situations currently clas-
sified as genetic diseases—Down's syndrome, Huntington's Chorea, and
Lesch-Nyhans disease, which all grossly create pain, suffering, and major
biological dysfunction—should have research and insurance preference
over height, and that this will remain the case whenever medical
resources are limited. Furthermore, even if everyone wants tall progeny,
and shortness is seen as a disease or deficit, so what? People have grown
progressively taller during human history; the extant suits of armor we
have inherited from the Middle Ages seem tailored for Yosemite Sam,
not Arnold Schwarzenegger. Surely height augmentation will not change
the human telos. Augmentation is an “is” change not an “ought” one.
And even if, as mentioned earlier, intelligence augmentation is viewed as
an “ought” change, it is difficult to see why higher intelligence raises a
moral problem. (This assumes, by the way, that intelligence could be aug-
mented by genetics alone, a highly debated notion since we don't even
know clearly what intelligence is.)
In sum, then, human genetic engineering at the “is” level to correct
obvious defects seems morally acceptable—perhaps obligatory—if it is
likely to improve biological function with little or no risk to the person
so engineered, or to others. The criteria for adjudicating the morality of
effecting genetic alteration at the “ought” level are far more difficult to
