Biomedical Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
unless they are radically altered or their consciousness distorted. That is
in fact the point of
Brave New World
. Given our historical moral em-
phasis on reason and autonomy as nonnegotiable ultimate goods for
humans, we believe in holding on to them, come what may. Efficiency,
productivity, wealth—none of these trump reason and autonomy, and
thus the
Brave New World
scenario is deemed unacceptable. On the
other hand, were Mill not a product of the same historical values but
rather truly consistent in his concern only for pleasure and pain, the
Brave New World
approach or otherwise changing people to make them
feel good would be a perfectly reasonable solution.
In the case of animals, however, there are no ur-values like freedom
and reason lurking in the background. We furthermore have a historical
tradition as old as domestication for changing (primarily agricultural)
animal telos (through artificial selection) to fit animals into human
society to serve human needs. We selected for nonaggressive animals;
animals that depend on us, not only on themselves; animals disinclined
or unable to leave our protection; and so on. Our operative concern has
always been to fit animals to us with as little friction as possible—as
discussed, this assured both success for farmers and good lives for the
animals.
If we now consider it essential to raise animals under conditions like
battery cages, it is not morally jarring to consider changing their telos to
fit those conditions in the same way that it jars us to consider changing
humans.
In other words, we would not accept as moral any genetic engineer-
ing of humans that conflicts directly with our long-standing and currently
strongly held moral traditions regarding what a human ought to be.
Though Aristotle might accept genetically engineering more and better
natural slaves, we certainly would not.
So I would argue first of all that genetically engineering changes
in humans at the “is” level of telos (always assuming no untoward
consequences) is morally acceptable if it preserves and increases the
well-being of humans. Changing elements of human nature at the
“ought” level should be constrained by our strongly held ethical tradi-
tions. I also acknowledge that sometimes the distinction is blurred; is
increasing human intellectual power an “is” or an “ought” change? It is
probably an “ought,” but one that may not create any moral concerns.
