Biomedical Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
dualism, the problem is still there: the parts do not adequately explain
the whole.
The examination of freedom from Duns Scotus's perspective also
forces to us look beyond materialism, but without denying our own bio-
logical nature. Here, we can reexamine Duns Scotus's distinction between
the affectio commodi and the affectio justitiae with complementary
insights from Ehrlich. The affectio commodi states that a given nature
will seek its own good. What this good is will be understood through an
examination of this nature. The concept is open, in my judgment, to
being understood in light of our knowledge of the nature of a particu-
lar organism in view of the best of our interdisciplinary or multidisci-
plinary knowledge. This would include, for example with human nature,
how both biological and cultural evolution shape who we are—that is,
how we define our nature. To say that we act according to our nature is
to say that we act as we do because we have evolved into beings of a
particular kind. Ehrlich refers to the experience of values that are con-
nected to such direct feelings as “perceived values.” These are the imme-
diate motivations or goods that guide our daily lives and actions, and
are tied closely to our evolutionary past. Ehrlich remarks,
Whereas the motivation to get our genes into the next generation may be the
distant cause of much of our behavior the immediate motivations are more famil-
iar. We rarely mate to reproduce ourselves; we ordinarily mate because it feels
good. We don't dodge an approaching car to preserve our ability to raise our
children; we do it to avoid anticipated pain or death. We don't eat to gain energy;
we eat to assuage hunger or for pleasure.
110
This is about as clear a restatement of Duns Scotus's affectio commodi
as one would want. It affirms both the biological and cultural dimen-
sions of the formation of our nature, but it also avoids a genetic reduc-
tionism by not suggesting a gene for each action. We act as we do because
of who we have become.
But for Duns Scotus this is not the end of the story, for we also expe-
rience another dimension to ourselves. In addition to the experience of
pursuing our good to fulfill or complete ourselves, we also experience
the desire to seek the good of another. This is Duns Scotus's affectio justi-
tiae—a check on our nature, if you will. This desire moves us in a dif-
ferent direction, not contrary to our nature, but transcending it. This
affection leads to a pursuit of the good, in Duns Scotus's perspective, for
its own sake or for the sake of one's neighbor. The affectio justitiae
