Biomedical Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
the sociobiologists describe this as selfish—which even in their frame-
work has a negative connotation.
But there remains this issue raised by the sociobiologists: Is such
genetically selfish activity the only possible mode of human activity? Or
as Duns Scotus would phrase it, can we see and actualize a good beyond
ourselves and our perfection, beyond the affectio commodi? Scotistic
thought would agree with the sociobiologists that as natures, we, like
any other nature, seek our good and our individual perfection, and that
we do so necessarily. But it would disagree that this is selfish in the pejo-
rative sense of sociobiology. In fact, I think from a Scotistic perspective,
the sociobiologists' discussion of genetic selfishness makes no sense at all
and is a significant distortion of human existence, as I will argue below.
Duns Scotus on Freedom and Altruism
Duns Scotus calls the affectio
justitiae or the affection for justice the source of true freedom or liberty
of the will, and this is the basis for his claim that true freedom goes
beyond freedom understood as choice. Additionally, the affectio justitiae
is the means by which we can transcend nature and go beyond our indi-
vidually defined good and ourselves to see the value of another being.
As Duns Scotus observes, “To want an act to be perfect so that by means
of it one may better love some object for its own sake, is something that
stems from the affection for justice, for whence I love something good
in itself, thence I will love something in
itself.
”
54
Wolter notes four characteristics of the affectio justitiae. First, it gives
us the capacity to love a being for itself rather than for what it can do
for us. Second, it enables us to love God for who God is rather than for
the consequence of God's love on us. Third, the affectio justitiae allows
us to love our neighbor as ourselves, thereby making each individual of
equal value. Finally, such a seeking for the good in itself leads to a desire
to have this good beloved by all rather than being held to oneself.
55
This
leads Wolter to the conclusion that the affectio justitiae amounts to a
“freedom
from
nature and a freedom for values.”
56
Or as Duns Scotus
puts it, “From the fact that it is able to temper or control the inclination
for what is advantageous, it follows that it is obligated to do so in accor-
dance with the rule of justice that it has received from a higher will.”
57
Such an understanding of will as affectio justitiae frees the will from
the constraints of the necessity of human nature's act of self-realization
