Biomedical Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
human nature. I do this, first, to set a general context for our discussion,
and second, to identify particular problems that can then be addressed
in light of other philosophical perspectives.
Freedom
The question of freedom and determinism is an ancient philo-
sophical concern, but it is also proving to be a critical scientific one.
Knowledge of the action of specific genes as well as the action and inter-
action of hundreds of genes has focused on the question of freedom in
an especially sharp way. The discipline of sociobiology in particular has
helped to refocus our attention on this issue. A general problem in socio-
biology is the tendency to assume that what is true of animal behavior
is also true of human behavior. Hence, one could assume that since a
large part of the human genome is shared with other animals, we are
simply following our genetic programs as they do. Some respond to this
by noting the presence of culture, understood broadly in a social and
biological sense, as a mediating force on our genome. So we need to
attend carefully to the question of whether or not there is direct evidence
of a genetic or cultural foundation for a particular trait or behavior, and
to what degree that foundation determines that behavior.
Another part of the problem is definitional. For example, Wilson (and
coauthor C. L. Lumsden) responded in the following way to the ques-
tion of whether the fact that the brain is programmed by the genes
destroys free will: “The biases in mental development are only biases;
the influence of the genes, even when very strong does not destroy free
will. In fact, the opposite is the case: by acting on culture through the
epigenetic rules, the genes create and sustain the capacity for conscious
choice and decision.”
19
This is a clear rejection of determinism and a
good example of gene-environment interaction. But it also identifies
freedom as choice. While that is a common understanding of freedom,
we need to reflect on whether it is a fully adequate one. Lumsden and
Wilson qualify freedom by stating that “while [humans] exercise free will
in moment-by-moment choices, this faculty remains superficial and its
value to the individual is largely illusory,” and “real freedom consists of
choosing our masters by a procedure that allows us to master them.”
20
This statement presents freedom as illusory, and in fact, we have this illu-
sion of freedom only because we choose what will determine our actions.
But the resolution is unsatisfactory. While we seem to make ourselves
