Biomedical Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
This return to our experience of the individual as a
tode ti
(some-thing
separable and identifiable) has several elements to it, some of which are
unavoidably Aristotelian, and some of which not. The Aristotelian
elements that are most unavoidable are the form and the matter of his
hylomorphic psychology. This is, of course, quite traditional, but the
hylomorphic psychology is worth a fresh look when it has been severed
from the traditional understanding of the structured teleology of Aris-
totle's own position. The less-traditional Aristotelian elements are the
basics of human life, which Aristotle himself, although obviously aware
of, ignored in favor of his teleological ideals of human life. These basics
are birth, suffering, and death (or as Aristotle insisted, that stories have
a beginning, a middle, and an end; even metaphysical explanation must
have a beginning, a middle, and an end). Every human being lives these
events; they are not the objects of choice, they are subjects of reflection,
and as such the substance of reflection.
A Hylomorphic Psychology
I would suggest that if there is to be an argument against genetic
enhancement that has immediate import for us as existing persons, it is
to be found in the tradition of Aristotle or Saint Thomas Aquinas—that
is, in a hylomorphic psychology. There are two basic reasons for this
claim, and one obvious objection. A hylomorphic psychology avoids
the Scylla of the abstract comfort of freedom in the face of the material
rootedness of the discussion of genetic enhancement, and the Charybdis
of a materialism that issues in a genetic determinism that undercuts the
very idea that there is a moral dilemma in this discussion. The obvious
objection is that a hylomorphic psychology is a curiosity rooted in an
outdated metaphysics, which has at best a nostalgic appeal in this
postmodern age. A full response to this objection would have to take to
task the predominant view of the last century, and there is no reason-
able opportunity to do that here. But insofar as the points made in favor
of discussing hylomorphic psychology in the context of genetic enhance-
ment have any persuasive power, they become a suggestion of the need
to question the resolutely antimetaphysical bent of contemporary phi-
losophy. It is in human frailty rooted in materiality and the possibility
