Biomedical Engineering Reference
In-Depth Information
may learn to hunt or to work in a group, assuming my existing abilities
allow that. For Rousseau, the history of our capacity for imitation is the
source of the inequality that so characterizes and divides modern society.
From such a perspective, the assertion of a particular psychological or
natural structure as characteristic of a human being is an ideological
claim that represents and defends a segment of the human population to
the detriment of the rest. Hence, Aristotle's human essence (not to
mention the virtues of the
Nicomachean Ethics
) is a representation of a
gentleman (the noble and the beautiful) of Athens circa 350 B.C.E., and
cannot be taken as any metaphysical claim about human nature.
With regard to questions of genetic engineering, however, freedom
speaks neither for nor against the quality of the body in which it resides.
Freedom is in one's response to the conditions of life, regardless of what
those conditions are. This in itself may suggest the lack of a true dis-
tinction between therapy and enhancement, if my inability to work in a
group is due to a physical impairment such as depression or fear. Treat
my depression or fear, and with my cured psyche I may now work in a
group, improving the lot of all humans by imitating other social animals.
If I live in a society that gives an advantage to tall people, then if I am
short, or come from a long line of short people, perhaps “correcting”
the gene for shortness will be a proper response to achieve imitative self-
improvement. This is much more difficult technically than learning to
work in a group, but in principle the very notion of freedom as self-
overcoming does not oppose the idea. All we are doing is overcoming
the currently understood limitations of human nature in favor of a per-
ceived advantage. Thus, a Rousseauian could be understood to demand
genetic enhancement rather than just tolerate it.
The only way to limit this possible influence of freedom would be
to condition freedom with some other concern that would address the
physical makeup of the free body. For example, the general will arising
from the social contract might develop a principle that for the general
good, such genetic engineering would be dangerous, and thus forbid it.
Or it might stipulate that a general physical equality is to be enforced
through genetic engineering. One's freedom regarding genetic manip-
ulation would then be understood as an acquiescence to this determina-
tion of the general will, and a social imperative would conclude the
debate.
