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the Physical Symbol Systems Hypothesis, we consider Smith's theory of the “origin
of objects” to be a
referential chain
with distinct stages (Halpin 2006):
Presentation
: Process
S
is connected with process
O
.
Input
: The process
S
is connected with
R
. Some local connection of
S
puts
R
in some causal relationship with process
O
via an encoding. This is entirely
non-spooky since
S
and
O
are both connected with
R
.
R
eventually becomes the
representation.
Separation
: Processes
O
and
S
change in such a way that the processes are
disconnected.
Output
: Due to some local change in process
S
,
S
uses its connection with
R
to
initiate local meaningful behaviour that is in part caused by
R
.
12
In the 'input' stage, the
referent
is the cause of some characteristic(s) of
the information. The relationship of
reference
is the relationship between the
encoding of the information (the representation) and the referent. The relationship
of interpretation becomes one of reference when the distal aspects of the content
are crucial for the meaningful behaviour of the agent, as given by the 'output'
stage. So we have constructed an ability to talk about representations and reference
while not presupposing that behaviour depends on internal representations or that
representations exist a priori at all. Representations are only needed when the
relevant intelligent behaviour requires some sort of distal co-ordination with a
disconnected thing.
So the interpretation of a representation - a particular kind of encoding of content
- results in behavior by the user-agent that is dependent on a distal referent via the
referential chain (Fig.
2.7
). In this manner, the act of reference can then be defined as
the interpretation of a representation. This would make our notion of representation
susceptible to being labelled a
correspondence theory of truth
(Smith 1986), where
a representation refers by some sort of structural correspondence to some referent.
However, our notion of representation is much weaker, requiring only a causation
between the referent and the representation - and not just any causal relationship, but
one that is meaningful for the interpreting agent - as opposed to some tighter notion
of correspondence such as some structural 'isomorphism' between a representation
and its “target,” the term used by Cummins to describe what we have called the
“referent” of a representation (1996). So an interpretation or an act of reference
should therefore not be viewed as a mapping to referents, but as a mapping to some
content - where that content leads to meaningful behaviour precisely because of
some referential chain. This leads to the notion of a Fregean 'objective' sense, which
we turn to later.
Up until now, it has been implicitly assumed that the referent is some physical
entity that is non-local to the representation, but the physical entity is still existent,
such as the Eiffel Tower. However, remember that the definition of non-local
includes
anything
the representation is disconnected from, and so includes physical
12
In terms of Newell's earlier definition, 0 is
X
while
S
is
P
and
R
is
Y
.
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