Theories of Semantics on theWeb - Social Semantics: The Search for Meaning on the Web - page 101

Putnam's analysis can be summarized as follows: Imagine that there is a world
“very much like Earth” called 'Twin Earth.' On Twin Earth “the liquid called
'water' is not H 2 O but a different liquid” whose chemical formula is abbreviated
as XYZ , and that this XYZ is “indistinguishable from water at normal temperatures
and pressures” since it “tastes like water and quenches thirst like water” (Putnam
1975). A person from Earth would incorrectly identify XYZ for their normal
referent of water, as it would satisfy all their descriptions. In this regard, this shows
that meanings “ain't in the head” but are in fact determined, not by individual
language use or descriptions, but by some indexical relationship to “stuff that is
like water around here” normally. That “stuff” should get its name and meaning
from experts , since “probably every adult speaker even knows the necessary and
sufficient condition 'water is H 2 O ,' but only a few adult speakers could distinguish
water from liquids which superficially resembled water...in case of doubt, other
speakers would rely on the judgment of these 'expert' speakers” who would ideally
test XYZ and determine that it was indeed, not water” (Putnam 1975). Indeed, less
outlandish examples, such as the difference between “beech trees” and “elm trees”
are trotted out by Putnam to show that a large amount of our names for things,
perhaps even extending beyond natural kinds, are actually determined by expert
knowledge (Putnam 1975). In this way, Kripke's baptism can extend to almost
all languages, and scientists can be considered a special sort of naming authority
capable of baptizing all sorts of things with a greater authority than everyone else.
As even Putnam explicitly acknowledges “Kripke's doctrine that natural-kind words
are rigid designators and our doctrine that they are indexical are but two ways of
making the same point” (Putnam 1975).

4.4.3 Direct Reference on the Web

This causal theory of reference is naturally close to the direct reference position
of Berners-Lee, whose background is in expert-created databases. He naturally
assumes the causal theory of reference is uncontroversial, for in database schemas,
what a term refers to is a matter best left to the expert designer of the database.
So Kripke and Putnam's account of unambiguous names can then be transposed to
the Web with a few minor variations in order to obey Berners-Lee's “crazy” dictum
that “URIs identify one thing” regardless of interpretation or even accessible web-
page (Berners-Lee 2003c). While it may be a surprise to find Berners-Lee to be a
closet Kripkean, Berners-Lee says as much, “that the Web is not the final arbiter
of meaning, because URI ownership is primary, and the look-up system of HTTP
is...secondary” (Berners-Lee 2003c). There is also an element of Grice in the direct
theory of reference, for the intended interpretation and perhaps even purpose of the
owner is the one that really matters to Berners-Lee, not any publicly accessible
particular Web representation (Grice 1957). However, ultimately Berners-Lee has
far more in common with the causal theory of reference, since although the URI