Theories of Semantics on theWeb - Social Semantics: The Search for Meaning on the Web - page 93

experiences” (called eigenpsychische by Carnap) cannot be directly described, as
they are irreducible, but only described by a network of logical predicates that treat
these experiences as logical constants (Carnap 1928). For examples of these kinds
of sentences, one would not say “The Eiffel Tower is made of reddish iron.” One
would say something more elementary like 'hard thing here now' or 'redness here
now' when bumping one's toe against the brute fact of the Eiffel Tower. Then these
sense-data - which were considered a priori true due to their verification by sense
experience - could be built up into larger complex sentences and names via logic.
Since natural language is part of the world, the structure of language too must be
logical, and range over these elementary sense experiences. In this regard, names are
given to their referents by concordance with a logical structure ranging over these
elementary sensory experiences. Carnap's project was similar in spirit to Chomsky's
syntactic theory of language, but focused on semantics rather than syntax: Carnap
hoped to develop a semantic and logical definition of meaning that would validate
only sentences with 'meaning' and dispose of all metaphysical notions, which would
naturally include likely most of Hegel and perhaps even Fregean sense.
Bertrand Russell begins the logical atomist investigation of the connection
between logic and names in language is his landmark investigation On Denoting
with a deceptively simple question: “is the King of France bald?” (Russell 1905).
To what referent does the description “the King of France” refer to? (Russell
1905) Since in Russell's time there was no King of France, it could not refer to
anything like what Carnap later called “elementary sense data” (Carnap 1928). In
this regard, Russell makes a crucial distinction. According to Russell, elementary
sensory experiences are known through acquaintance , in which we have some sort
of direct 'presentation of' the thing (Russell 1905). According to Russell, these
statements of acquaintance with directly present sensory data employ what are
known as Russellian demonstratives (such as 'this' or 'that') as exemplified by the
statement “That is the Eiffel Tower.” Yet knowledge of a thing can be based on
descriptions , which are those “things we only reach by means of denoting phrases”
(Russell 1905). Russell believed that “all thinking has to start from acquaintance,
but it succeeds in thinking about many things with which we have no acquaintance”
via the use of description (Russell 1905). Russell was most interested in whether
those things with which we have direct acquaintance can be considered true or false,
or whether a more mysterious third category such as 'nonsense' is needed. Russell
opts to reject creating imaginary but true 'things' as well as any third category, but
instead holds that statements such as “the King of France is bald” are false, since
“it is false that there is an entity which is now the King of France and is bald”
(Russell 1905). This solution then raises the alarming possibility that “the King of
France is not bald” may also come out false, which would seem to violate the Law
of the Excluded Middle. So, Russell counters this move by introducing the fact
that “the King of France is bald” is actually a complex logical statement involving
scope and quantification, namely ,where F

is “being the King of France” and G is “being bald” (Russell 1905). According to
the analysis, 'The King of France' is merely a disguised complex logical statement.
Furthermore, this treatment can be extended to proper names such as 'Sir Walter

( ∃ x . F ( x ) ∧ G ( x )) ∧ ( ∀ y . F ( y ) → x = y )