The Wages of Peace - Hun Sen's Cambodia - page 64

Many observers have accused Hun Sen of engineering the secession in order to strong-
arm Funcinpec into accepting a coalition deal. There is also evidence to suggest Sihan-
ouk acquiesced to the secession, which gave him an opportunity to step in and “save”
his country from partition, though Hun Sen eventually took most of the credit. 75 After
the affair had passed, Sihanouk praised the secessionists for returning to the fold, and,
in a particularly Cambodian twist, elevated Chakrapong to the rank of four-star general.
Whatever its causes, the outcome was a caricature of the democratic process. A coali-
tion government was probably inevitable, given the fact that no party had the two-thirds
majority necessary to form a government alone. But the theater of secession meant that
winners and losers both ended up with an equal share of the spoils. 76
As the secession drama was playing out, Sihanouk convened a constituent assembly
that annulled the 1970 coup and formally appointed him as head of state. The prince was
ecstatic, and wrote to each of the members to thank them for their “historic” decision.
Three months later, on September 24, the assembly promulgated a new constitution, draf-
ted by foreign experts and representatives from the four factions. In the spirit of the times,
it was a liberal work of art, guaranteeing Cambodians a full panoply of civil and political
rights. Sihanouk was restored to the throne with restricted powers—the constitution spe-
cified that “the king reigns but does not govern”—and the interim government became
the Royal Government of Cambodia under the dual leadership of Ranariddh, who was
appointed “first prime minister,” and Hun Sen, who was appointed “second”.
Having chalked up the elections as a success, UNTAC had little inclination to oppose
this farcical new power-sharing arrangement. Akashi more or less acquiesced, saying he
“highly appreciated the efforts of Hun Sen” in ending the secession crisis, and UNTAC
started packing its bags. 77 “Everybody was basically tired of the whole thing and wanted
to create a fix that Cambodians could live with and get out,” said Timothy Carney, the
former American diplomat who headed UNTAC's Information and Education Division,
“and the Cambodians were about ready to see the end of the foreigners, too.” 78
During the mission's final months, UNTAC was hit by a series of coordinated car
thefts, carried out in daring night-time raids on UN compounds. No one knew for sure
who was behind the burglaries, though some of the cars later showed up outside the
homes of powerful officials. When UNTAC officers raided the house of a Cambodian
official suspected of having stolen a Land Cruiser, they were held at gunpoint for seven
hours. “We are fed up,” said one UN official. “We are losing cars every night.” 79 By
September 1993, a total of 1,898 vehicles had been stolen, worth an estimated $15.8 mil-
lion. This was followed by another $1.3 million worth of satellite equipment and $23.9
million in computers and other supplies. 80 The thefts showed just how much contempt
the Cambodian authorities had for the authority of the UN. “I present my apologies to the