The Second Revolution - Hun Sen's Cambodia - page 44

But by the mid-1980s a military solution had become remote. Despite significant gains
during the 1984-5 dry season, when Vietnamese forces routed resistance bases in west-
ern Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge insurgency continued from new bases inside Thailand.
The occupation of Cambodia was bleeding Hanoi white, while morale among the Vi-
etnamese rank-and-file—“dressed in rags, puritanically fed, mostly disease-ridden,” as
Nayan Chanda reported 50 —was at an all-time low. The PRK also faced mounting discon-
tent over the “K5 Plan,” a scheme to construct a barrier of minefields and dikes along the
Thai border to prevent the infiltration of resistance forces. Tens of thousands were drafted
into the K5 construction teams, which endured harsh conditions in the forested border re-
gions. Malaria was rampant and hundreds fell victim to landmines. 51 The return of forced
labor brigades prompted uncomfortable comparisons with the DK regime, triggering fur-
ther defections to the resistance zones.
On the other side of the front line, the noncommunist resistance was stagnating.
Hampered by internal power struggles and heavy losses during the Vietnamese offensives
of 1984-5, the KPNLF had ceased to be an effective military force. Many of its leaders
seemed more interested in smuggling and black marketeering than fighting the occupa-
tion. Funcinpec, riven by its own leadership squabbles, was only marginally more effect-
ive. Timothy Carney, the former US diplomat, described the noncommunist resistance
groups as “feckless” and “quasi-competent.” 52 Only the Khmer Rouge were militarily vi-
able, but in the short term the best even they could hope for was stalemate.
Superpower realignments eventually tipped the balance toward a diplomatic solution.
In July 1986 Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev delivered a speech in the Pacific port city
of Vladivostok that signaled Moscow's desire for a normalization of relations with Ch-
ina. Since the presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia had long been one of the chief
impediments to normalization, the Soviets pressured Hanoi to reach a settlement. At the
same time, regional diplomatic efforts—particularly by Australia and Indonesia—moved
forward. By 1986 the outline of a potential settlement had taken shape. Though the spe-
cific plan was scuttled by Beijing and the Khmer Rouge before it could be discussed at
the ASEAN meeting of foreign ministers that June, the promising blueprint envisaged a
Vietnamese withdrawal in line with a cessation of Chinese support for the PDK, which
would be backed by the deployment of an international peacekeeping force around Cam-
bodia's land and sea borders. 53 One problem was that the Cambodian factions—the PRK
and the three resistance groups that made up the CGDK—refused to meet. A CGDK pro-
posal issued in March 1986 mooted the formation of a four-party interim government, but
this was dismissed by Vietnam as “nonsense.” The PRK controlled most of the country,
it said, and this fait accompli should be reflected in any future arrangement. 54 The resist-
ance groups continued to oppose any presence of Vietnamese troops on Cambodian soil,
and refused to deal with the Phnom Penh regime on equal terms.