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drawn up plans to arrest Pol Pot and spirit him off for trial in a third country, a scheme
which was foiled by his death the following year. The commitment stemmed partly from
guilt about past American actions in Cambodia, but also figured as a way for the US to
reclaim its moral high-ground and underscore its supposedly redemptive role in interna-
tional affairs. To get the talks back on track, Washington turned to its Ambassador-at-
Large for War Crimes Issues, David Scheffer, who raised the idea of establishing a “spe-
cial chambers” within the Cambodian court system, filled with local and foreign jurists.
Under Scheffer's plan, judicial decisions would be determined by a so-called “superma-
jority”; Cambodian judges would form a majority, but would require the vote of at least
one international judge for any important decision.
Zacklin and his boss, Hans Corell, the UN's Swedish chief legal counsel, were hesitant
to accept the supermajority formula. But it was an easier sell for the Cambodians. For
Hun Sen, it offered the possibility of allowing him control over the tribunal while also be-
nefiting from international involvement. As a further lure, US officials also made it clear
that increased aid was in the offing if Hun Sen accepted the deal, and pressed the UN to
adopt a more “flexible” approach to the negotiations—that is, to dilute its demands. The
bar inched downwards. In January 2001, Cambodia unilaterally passed a draft law for the
establishment of the ECCC, containing many of the terms to which the UN had previ-
ously objected.
In early 2002, Annan abruptly pulled out of the negotiations. A few weeks earlier,
Corell had signed an agreement setting up the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL),
which featured a similar “mixed” model to the proposed Cambodian court. Unlike the
Cambodians, the authorities in Freetown had willingly agreed to a majority of internation-
al judges and other UN demands. Compared to the ease of setting up the SCSL, Cambod-
ia suddenly seemed like too much trouble. “My feeling in negotiating with Sierra Leone
is that they wanted a truly independent court,” Corell told me. What Cambodia wanted
was something else entirely, “a creature that would not fulfill international standards for
criminal justice, and still bear the emblem of the UN.”
Organizations like Human Rights Watch supported the UN's move, along with many
Cambodian NGOs. Others took the opposite view. One of the few dissenters in Cambod-
ian civil society was Youk Chhang of DC-Cam, who said the world shouldn't abandon its
efforts to bring the Khmer Rouge to justice. Scheffer agreed, writing that the insistence
on “near-perfect justice” risked “losing the good for the sake of the unattainable.” 11 As
the debate raged, international pressure mounted on the UN. Like the Americans, Cam-
bodia's other donor countries all had their own political reasons for wanting the court to
succeed. In November 2002 France and Japan sponsored a General Assembly resolution
“authorizing” Annan to return to the negotiations. Corell was effectively ordered back to
Cambodia to resume talks. “Basically my hands were tied,” he said. Without the backing
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