Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
known killers tended their gardens. With the Khmer Rouge on the verge of collapse, it
seemed like a perfect time to press the case for justice.
On June 21, 1997, just two weeks before Hun Sen's violent overthrow of Prince Ranar-
iddh, Hammarberg convinced both leaders to sign a letter to the new UN Secretary-Gen-
eral, Kofi Annan, formally requesting UN assistance for a tribunal. Shrewdly playing on
the fierce rivalry between the two politicians, then competing for the allegiance of the
remaining Khmer Rouge fighters, Hammarberg first approached the Funcinpec leader.
Then he presented Hun Sen with Ranariddh's signature and challenged him to add his
own. Having agitated for years for the trial of leading Khmer Rouge figures, Hun Sen
could hardly afford to be outflanked by a political rival. He too signed. And so the seed
of the ECCC was planted firmly in Cambodia's domestic politics.
In New York, the gears of the UN's bureaucracy creaked slowly into motion. Annan dis-
patched a Group of Experts to study the feasibility of a trial. Their report, released in early
1999, foreshadowed the problems and divisions to come. The experts concluded that tri-
als against surviving Khmer Rouge leaders were workable, but should only take place in
The Hague or in another outside country. The Cambodian courts were simply too corrupt,
and only a fully international court could guard against government meddling. “The more
insulated the tribunal can be from domestic politics,” the report concluded, “the better.” 4
For Hun Sen this was out of the question. If trials were to take place, they would be
in his courts and on his terms. One reason was that he wanted control over the scope of
any potential prosecutions. Under the government's amnesty policy, thousands of Khmer
Rouge soldiers and mid-level cadres had already been reintegrated into Cambodian so-
ciety, with little regard for their past actions. The question of who should be tried was
sensitive for many in the CPP. Chea Sim, the elderly CPP president, had served as party
secretary of Sector 20, in DK's Eastern Zone, which was ravaged by purges in 1977-8.
Heng Samrin had been commander of the zone's Fourth Division, suspected of massac-
ring Vietnamese civilians during cross-border incursions in 1977. Did they have a hand
in Khmer Rouge atrocities?
The same question hung over key cabinet members. The finance minister, Keat Chhon,
had worked in the DK Foreign Ministry under Ieng Sary and didn't defect until 1984,
settling in France and going on to a career in the UN before returning to Cambodia in
1992 and becoming an economic advisor to Hun Sen. Then there was Hor Namhong, Hun
Sen's long-serving foreign minister. As a young diplomat, Namhong had rallied to Prince
Sihanouk's government-in-exile in 1970, representing it in Paris and Havana. After the
Khmer Rouge took power in April 1975, he joined an exodus of intellectuals and dip-
lomats called back home to serve the revolution. Upon his arrival he was immediately
sent to Boeung Trabek, a prison in Phnom Penh where hundreds of fellow intellectuals
Search WWH ::




Custom Search