Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
language of democracy and universal rights is often used more to court international sup-
port than out of a commitment to principle.
Even for the more independent and professional NGOs, the undemocratic nature of the
CPP's rule means that they often end up on the same side of the debate as opposition
parties. Shared objectives are strengthened by personal and historical ties. Leading civil
society figures come from the same generation of foreign-educated diaspora Cambodians
who fought against the CPP in the 1980s and formed the leadership of opposition parties
like Funcinpec, the BLDP, and the SRP. Politicians like Kem Sokha have even moved
back and forth between the two camps.
As a result, Hun Sen and the CPP have always viewed civil society with suspicion.
After the 1980s, when they were treated as pariahs by the democratic nations of the West,
they saw UNTAC as merely a new and more sophisticated strategy for unseating them
from power, a Trojan horse painted in pluralistic colors. The civil society groups that
emerged from its flanks weren't the vanguard of a “new world order”; they were the fifth
column for a hostile West. “Nongovernment” meant “antigovernment.”
The attitude of Hun Sen and his opponents is consistent with a Cambodian political cul-
ture that has never tolerated much opposition. Sihanouk had little time for what we would
today term “civil society.” Lon Nol jailed critics and bumped off political dissidents with
no concern for their “rights”. Pol Pot then elevated paranoia and terror into a self-con-
suming system of government. In a political culture where power is perceived as a reward
for high stocks of merit rather than an outgrowth of a popular mandate, criticisms have
often prompted violent reactions. To question a leader has traditionally been to question
his merit, and hence his right to rule. Today, after two decades of electoral politics, the
concept of a “loyal opposition” still doesn't exist in any meaningful way. No Cambodian
leader has ever bowed gracefully to the will of the people as expressed through the ballot
box, or offered to work with the people who defeated him. If Hun Sen and his political
opponents are united by anything, it's a Manichean perception of the other as illegitimate,
disloyal and—most importantly—“un-Khmer.”
Like its predecessors and opponents, Hun Sen's government has gone to great lengths
to paint itself as the only true embodiment of “Khmerness.” Everything on the other side
of the equation—opposition parties, the press, foreign donors, NGOs, anyone advocating
democratic principles—is pilloried as foreign and alien. Antigovernment demonstrations
are “against” Khmer tradition, as are popular calls for social justice. Tep Vanny and the
Boeung Kak lake protestors have been accused of lacking traditional values, of having
Hun Sen, the very act of opposition is considered “un-Khmer.” The only truly “Cambod-
ian” attitude is to accept one's lot, thank the CPP for its charity, and provide an appreci-
ative audience for Hun Sen during his rural excursions. In this “democracy with Khmer
