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In-Depth Information
was working in Ratanakkiri at the time. “There is no way that the logging in VNP was
not known about at national level.”
When information about the Indochine Resources exploration deal emerged in
mid-2007, the World Bank finally pulled the plug on BPAMP. In its final assessment re-
port it cited the project's “positive institutional impacts,” including the passage of a new
Law on Protected Areas, drafted with the Bank's assistance. As usual, the law adhered
to the best international standards. It divided up each of Cambodia's protected areas into
four conservation areas, including a “sustainable use zone” that could be used for com-
mercial activities like mining once the proper zoning had taken place. But as with illegal
logging, foreign legal consultants made the mistake of assuming Cambodian officials had
any real incentive to enforce the regulations.
It seemed the World Bank still hadn't learnt its lesson. Its final assessment was that
improvements in national park management remained a technical matter, requiring the
“continued strengthening of the [Environment] Ministry's managerial and coordination
government's aim wasn't conservation; it was economic exploitation. The Bank wasn't
responsible for the deforestation, of course, but the road to environmental neglect had
been paved with its own optimistic assumptions. In its entire project assessment report,
the words “patronage” and “corruption” were mentioned exactly once.
In the years since the Indochine deal, dozens of licenses to explore for bauxite, gold, and
copper have been awarded in the same ad hoc fashion as Cambodia's forest and land con-
country's most valuable resource: its oil and gas deposits. Questions still remain about the
extent and commercial viability of Cambodia's reserves, thought to exist both offshore
and under the Tonlé Sap lake, but the interest of foreign firms like US oil giant Chevron
and France's Total indicates the country could be in for a future windfall totaling in the
billions.
In 2014, Cambodia faces the same issue it faced with forestry two decades ago. If man-
aged well, oil and gas revenues might be enough to wean the government off foreign aid
and lift countless Cambodians out of poverty. But so far it looks like business as usu-
al. In 1998 Hun Sen shifted control of oil revenue management from the Ministry of In-
dustry, Energy, and Mines to a new Cambodian National Petroleum Authority (CNPA),
later placed under the control of his economic gatekeeper, Sok An. The CNPA's activities
are cloaked in secrecy. “Key positions are populated by his [Sok An's] in-laws,” said one
foreign NGO worker with knowledge of the institution. “It's pretty clear what's coming.”
Under Sok An, the CNPA refused to disclose details of its agreements with foreign oil
companies and has baulked at revealing the signature bonuses these firms have paid to
