The Peasant King - Hun Sen's Cambodia - page 117

much headway in the CPP's rural heartland. Rainsy protested that the election result had
been skewed by intimidation and voter-list manipulation. Again, the international mon-
itors complained of “shortcomings,” made “recommendations” for future elections, and
applied a reluctant stamp of approval. Again, most of the tampering had taken place long
before election day. An EU election monitor in rainy Kampot pinpointed the dilemma.
“The elections were free,” he told me, “but free for dependent people.”
For the first time since the signing of the Paris Agreements, the CPP was in full control
of Cambodia. Sihanouk and Ranariddh had retired and Rainsy—spit out like Sihanouk's
proverbial cherry pit—was cast back onto the political margins. It had taken 15 years,
but the CPP had finally wrenched back the control it had been forced to cede during the
UNTAC mission.
Hun Sen had always regarded the UN with contempt. In 2001, he called the UNTAC
elections the “worst elections the world has seen in the 21th century,” and said Cambodi-
ans alone were responsible for the peace that followed. 7 Three years later he dropped the
annual commemoration of the October 23 signing of the Paris Agreements from Cambod-
ia's crowded roster of national holidays. The CPP had finally repudiated a UN interven-
tion for which it had never asked and a democratic system it had never wanted. A mirage
of democratic constitutionalism obscured a system that operated much as always-through
the manipulation of money and personal connections. Hun Sen's Cambodia appeared to
have reached its apotheosis.
In late 1993, shortly after retaking the throne, Sihanouk had given Hun Sen the title sam-
dech , meaning “lord” or “prince.” His title quickly sprouted branches and grew into Sam-
dech Akka Moha Sena Padei Techo Hun Sen , a page-consuming epithet which ascribed
to him the qualities of “Illustrious Prince, Great Supreme Protector, and Famed Warrior.”
It must have been satisfying for Hun Sen. Since his earliest years in politics, Cambodia's
leader had been driven by a deep craving for legitimacy. Hun Sen lacked the divine right
of Cambodia's royals and the instant brand recognition of its old political families. He
was self-made. He had risen by dint of sheer ruthless pragmatism and single-minded ded-
ication to the weighing and accumulation of power. When the facts didn't fit his vision of
reality, well, so much the worse for the facts.
But simply being in charge was never enough. Each of Hun Sen's victories—over local
rivals, over factional foes, over the “international community”—only stoked his hunger
for more and greater successes. Year by year, state propaganda described Hun Sen in in-
creasingly superhuman terms—as a military genius, a political mastermind, and “a hu-
man being with a golden heart.” 8 The trappings of his rule became increasingly royal. He
presided over ceremonies traditionally associated with the monarchy. He began award-
ing his own “royal” ranks. When they ruled over Cambodia, the Angkorian God-Kings