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election campaign. Human rights groups would be permitted to continue their work and
an election would be held as planned in mid-1998. King Sihanouk, overseas at the time
of the fighting, had initially described his son's ejection from power as “illegal and un-
constitutional” but now, seeing the futility of further opposition, backed the status quo,
undercutting Funcinpec's campaign against Hun Sen.
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Many international observers saw through the ruse. With Ranariddh out of the country
and other Funcinpec officials scared for their lives, elections would mean little. Brad
Adams, a UN lawyer based in Phnom Penh, told a US Congressional Committee:
Hun Sen has staked out a clear strategy: create the appearance of a constitutional, multi-party
government and political system, such as by placing a malleable figure such as Ung Huot in the
position of first prime minister, hold elections next year without any semblance of a real opposi-
tion, exercise control over all levers of government, dominate the electronic media, and wait for
the international community to hold its nose and declare the elections minimally free and fair.
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But Cambodia's foreign backers saw few other options. Diplomats deplored Hun Sen's
bloody takeover, but many of them also saw the CPP as vital for political stability. “Is this
not better than getting back into the sterile game of propping up Ranariddh?” Tony Kevin
wrote in a confidential cable shortly after Hun Sen's power-grab. “It seems to me that this
seemed like the best way to restore order and a functioning government. “Let's be real-
istic,” one French diplomat told Philip Gourevitch of the
New Yorker
. “We get Hun Sen
elected, not free and fair like in other countries, but OK good enough. Then we can have
legitimacy, diplomacy, investment, order, and these people can get on with their lives.”
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In the diplomatic frenzy that occupied late 1997 and early 1998, securing the return
of Ranariddh—the crucial ingredient for a minimally credible poll—became the overrid-
ing aim. Eventually Japan helped broker a solution. Under Tokyo's plan, the CPP held a
bogus trial at which Ranariddh was found guilty on a raft of prefabricated charges and
sentenced to 30 years jail. He was also ordered to pay $54 million in compensation for
damage from the fighting and looting, even though this was almost entirely carried out by
the CPP's forces. Then Sihanouk stepped in and offered his son a royal pardon, allowing
him to return in time for the election. On March 30, Ranariddh returned to Cambodia and
hunkered down at the Hotel Le Royal, where he resumed plotting Hun Sen's demise—this
time at the ballot box.
The CPP could afford to make some concessions. It still controlled the police, the mil-
itary, the courts, and most of the print and broadcast media. Its opponents were scattered
and fearful. Unlike five years before, the 1998 election would be administered by a newly
