Travel Reference
In-Depth Information
to stop the fighting.” 26 If the country moved in the direction of democracy, all the bet-
ter—but this was never a central objective. “The big story out of every annual World
Bank meeting was corruption,” said another Western ambassador posted in Cambodia at
the time. “There were no real sanctions in spite of all the threats. Most of us were happy
just to see the country stable and with reasonable fiscal discipline at the center.”
After UNTAC's departure, foreign nations doubled-down on their Cambodian gamble,
pledging $770 million in aid in 1994, followed by $520 million the next year. They issued
lukewarm condemnations of Rainsy's expulsion from the National Assembly and other
human rights violations, but satisfied themselves with vague promises from the govern-
ment that it would combat corruption, overhaul the country's financial system, and end
human rights abuses. All of these goals were vague and aspirational, a utopian horizon-
line toward which Cambodia would drift, donors hoped, if the winds of international sup-
port stayed strong.
In truth, neither of Cambodia's prime ministers had much interest in democracy. Hun
Sen lashed out at even mild criticisms from the West, accusing foreigners of trampling
on Cambodian sovereignty. Ranariddh held similar views. In a revealing manifesto pub-
lished in mid-1995, the law professor argued that democracy in Cambodia was “just a
phrase to be talked about in idle gossip” and stated that “discipline is more essential in
our society.” 27 The “Ranariddh doctrine” provided the blueprint for an accelerating gov-
ernment crackdown on political dissent. The government passed a new Press Law in July
1995, which criminalized the publication of any information that harmed “national se-
curity” or degraded the authorities. More attacks followed. In October a mob of villagers
from Kraingyov commune in Kandal province, where Hun Sen had sponsored rural de-
velopment projects, ransacked the offices of Sereipheap Thmei (“New Liberty”) after the
paper published a story critical of the scheme. Hun Sen later applauded the actions of
the villagers, denouncing their critics as “Khmer Rouge.” 28 In September 1995 Freder-
ick Z. Brown, a professor of Southeast Asian studies at Johns Hopkins University, told
a US Congressional Subcommittee that the noisy Khmer-language press spawned by the
UNTAC mission had “been pretty much cowed into submission.” 29
After Sam Rainsy's expulsion from the National Assembly, opposition lawmakers
clammed up for fear of losing their seats (or worse), and the parliament became a rubber-
stamp for CPP-tabled legislation. At the same time, CPP leaders tried to buy off op-
position members with bribes and government posts. The first party to collapse was
the BLDP. After the 1993 election, the party had disintegrated in a fight between Son
Sann, the party's founder, and information minister Ieng Mouly, who formed a breakaway
BLDP faction and aligned himself to the CPP. (“I needed the support of Hun Sen to make
a big splash,” Mouly later said. “I couldn't say no.”) 30 In late September 1995, as the
Son Sann faction of the BLDP prepared to hold a national congress, two men on a mo-
Search WWH ::




Custom Search