The Mind - Brutes or Angels: Human Possibility in the Age of Biotechnology - page 242

variation within populations, and the continual emergence of genetic mu-
tations is a normal biological phenomenon.
subjectively, one might consider the most desirable traits to be normal
and departure from this subjective standard of normalcy as abnormal, dis-
abled, or diseased. Dwarfism, congenital deafness, intersexuality, and very
short and tall stature are conditions some consider to be abnormal or dis-
abling. But persons with these conditions may not consider themselves dis-
abled and are pleased to be who they are.
Diagnostic creep is a term used by bioethicist richard Dees (2008) to de-
scribe the classification of a condition as a disease simply because there
is an intervention available to ameliorate it. for example, when i was in
grade school, children who were especially talkative and active were con-
sidered extroverts, but after the advent of ritalin and Adderall, children
with those same traits began being diagnosed with ADhD and given pre-
scriptions to relieve their symptoms. imagine diagnostic creep applied to
cognitive functions where iQ measurements, memory tests, or other as-
sessments of analytical skills are used to determine who is eligible for
therapy with neuroenhancing drugs or electronic devices. The arbitrari-
ness of defining cut-off points for cognition therapy and problems with
cross-cultural intelligence testing create an extensive gray area between
therapy and enhancement in the realm of mental function. This vast ter-
ritory of ambiguity lends support to the notion that neuroenhancement
should be available to all who wish to use it.
on the other hand, there are clear-cut examples at the ends of the spec-
trum of cognitive abilities, from developmentally disabled persons and de-
mentia victims to intellectual geniuses. if neuroenhancements are used
to therapeutically lift those at the lower end of the spectrum into a space
where they can function more independently in society, why should neu-
roenhancements be denied to those whose cognitive abilities comprise the
central or higher regions of a Bell curve? for those who believe that therapy
is fine but enhancement is not, the answer to this question must be to deny
the smart from becoming smarter through drugs or other interventions.
But, to reasonably hold this position, one needs to explain why chemical-
or electronic-based enhancement of mental function is fundamentally im-