Biology Reference
In-Depth Information
André admitted that the Rwandans made serious mistakes early on, and eventually began simply
looting the country, but he defended their initial involvement. “When the Congolese write about
Rwanda, it's always in the wrong way. If Rwanda was an occupying force, then Zimbabwe and
Namibia would be occupying forces, because they were fighting in Kabila's stead, as was Angola. .
. . But now that there are no more occupying forces, what are we going to do with the Congo? Let's
stop accusing people. Yesterday we accused the Belgians. Now it's the Rwandans. But the Belgians
aren't here anymore. The Rwandans aren't here. The Zimbabweans and Angolans aren't here. This
is a Congolese problem. This country belongs to us. We have to accept that we have an obligation
to our population and our country; otherwise, we'll find occupying forces everywhere.”
André is referring to “the myth of the yoke,” the view that many Congolese hold of, in the words
of Thomas Turner, “a passive Congo, vastly rich, preyed on by outsiders.” They believe that foreign
governments have been stealing from them, manipulating their politics, and that the Rwandans and
Ugandans came as “agents of the West.” But while André acknowledged that the Rwandans and
Ugandans ultimately did exactly what the Congolese expect outsiders to do, he rejected the idea that
the effort to topple Kabila was misguided, and he believed that if Kabila had remained in power, he
never would have allowed true democracy. André knew that the RCD would be hugely unpopular
among many Congolese, but he didn't want to endure another decade of powerlessness and poverty.
Today, given the Congolese's hatred of the RCD, it is difficult to recall just how much Kabila's
rule resembled that of Mobutu: suspending political parties and managing more than half of the na-
tion's funds himself. His encouragement of racial hatred against Tutsis, the murders of Congolese
ethnic Tutsis, and his use of the former Hutu army and
génocidaires
as his personal force tipped
many of those in the east in favor of the Rwandans. Ernest Wamba dia Wamba stated that his mis-
sion was to establish democracy, and many like André supported him.
When the war broke out, Kabila funded the Mai Mai, the numerous rebel groups that arose to
protect territory or for larger political and economic reasons. The RCD massacred civilians ostens-
ibly in an attempt to stop the insurgency or as reprisals for their own losses, and its lack of man-
power and funding transformed it into what Jason Stearns describes as “a predator that sucked re-
sources out of the population and provided next to nothing in return.” Telling his story, André ad-
mitted that the force he supported had done a great deal of harm.
At first, he was in charge of logistics, provisioning RCD troops and managing their movement.
Then he began recruiting, wanting to explain to the people why this war was important. Eventually,
he decided that he should lead the 3,700 Congolese men who'd chosen to join, and he put himself
through military training alongside them. But the war only dragged on, and as it did, further divi-
sions emerged among the rebels.
“All wars are won with a population,” André told me. “If the population believes in a cause and
takes it to heart, then they support the war. The first war was supported by everyone. The second
war didn't have the support of everyone. The Congolese didn't understand why people rebelled
against Kabila so quickly. The rebels had Rwanda and Uganda for support. The population didn't
appreciate the second war. But the second war was very important because Kabila wanted to be a
dictator even more than Mobutu had. The nepotism that people denounced under Mobutu was start-
ing again. We were in a state of auto-proclamation, where there was no government. The politics
of Kabila weren't adapted to the real world. He should have kept good relationships with allies, but
relationships with neighboring countries were worsening.”
