Religion, Soka Gakkai Buddhists and political participation - Religion and Politics in Contemporary Japan - page 204

was a more straightforward campaign than it had been for the previous 10
years. Reiterating what they had proclaimed the year before during the 2009
election, this time people listened as the euphoria for Minshut - had ebbed
somewhat and certainly in Okinawa. Although this was an Upper House
election, Komeito was recovering from its loss in 2009. This was because its
support base remained committed, with a fairly good grasp of political issues
and the nuances of debates, which they continued to discuss with their friends.
While not well known before he became the new Komeito leader, Yamaguchi
for many supporters had by 2010 proven to be a person of detailed knowledge
about policies, articulate and easy to understand, and who had a sincere and
unassuming personality. Similar to how Hamayotsu had been seen to embody
what the party stood for in previous years, he arguably better represents the
party than previous heads such as Ota or Kanzaki, who while respected by
supporters, also came to be seen as entangled with the old way of politics
dominated by the LDP. Komeito is continuing to map out a role for itself that
is proving important as a player between the bigger parties.
Over the 10 years as a coalition partner it took the position of jitsugen
seiken, a political party with the power to realise its policies while having to
be accountable for its failures in other aspects. This was a volatile position to
be in as a small party, as demonstrated by the later SDP coalition with the
now governing Minshut - in 2009, a position that failed less than a year later,

but which did not bene it the SDP despite it breaking the coalition over

ideological issues. Assessing Komeito and its supporters according to the

'

party s compromises puts the question as to whether they stuck to their ideals

or not as a zero-sum battle. Such a more abstract analysis might conclude
that since they compromised, maintaining power was more important. This,
however, falls short of understanding the political engagement of Soka
Gakkai youth members, and of the position Komeito took with relative
although by no means complete success. Assessing politics as an '

issue misses the interface with dominant discourses where political choices are
seen to either include or exclude ideals. Such an analysis is based on seeing
compromise as an expression of negative power, made out of self-interest
rather than also the fact that di

' either/or

erences of opinion co-exist. Some might say
it could be an example of how the Japanese are more willing to bend the truth
(van Wolferen 1989), but here it also highlights the process of democracy
where a plurality of opinions and conditions inform choices made. Many of
the young supporters of Komeito (who of course until 2009 had only sup-
ported a party in a coalition position) opined that sticking to ideals and
achieving little in that direction is actually less ideal than taking the more
di s ideals.

This was a general sentiment among young people who actively supported
Komeito and who only in 2010 experienced supporting Komeito as an oppo-
sition party. Yet a minority of mainly older supporters also stopped support-
ing Komeito during its coalition years because they viewed the compromises
as ideological betrayal. Still the majority of those who had long supported the

cult road of compromise and trying to move policies towards one '