Religion, Soka Gakkai Buddhists and political participation - Religion and Politics in Contemporary Japan - page 203

religious group. Certainly, right-wing or nationalist groups oppose this poli-
tical agenda (as very conspicuous opposition from such groups continues).
Yet, being much less about group loyalty, young people in this topic were
found to raise awareness of issues that were neither unique to Soka Gakkai
nor protect one particular group. Komeito policies are not sectarian, but
re ect a general but grounded concern with wider social issues. While the

details of their policies may be open for debate they are not reactionary nor
populist. Moreover, it is hard to see how young Soka Gakkai members sup-

port for Komeito is simply zealous without constituting political activity, as
argued by Shimada (2007).
Those Soka Gakkai members that supported Komeito

'

s coalition status for
10 years, despite a variety of major dilemmas, did so because they perceived it
to be the best way at the time to have an in

'

uence on policies dominated by
the LDP. This could be judged from a perspective of their wanting to stay in
power, but it was clearly not the only outcome as Komeito politicians did have a
considerable moderating e

ect on LDP policies (cf. Hardacre 2005). As the
previous chapters highlighted, for Komeito the e ect of the coalition years

has been both positive and negative. They clearly lost in 2009 mostly for being
seen to be too deeply entwined with old-style, bureaucracy-led politics that
dominated the long LDP rule. It is less clear if such a style of politics changed
with the move to a Minshut - -led government. Already a year later by the
Upper House election of July 2010, Minshut - had to confront the short-
comings of its policies, and its poor handling of the Futenma relocation issue, not
to mention the money scandals embroiling its top representatives. Komeito
and the LDP bounced back to some extent. The comeback was restrained by
the newly rising political party Minna no T - (Everybody ' s Party), the party

that attracted many of the una liated voters now disillusioned with Min-

shut - . Unlike the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the brief coalition of which
with the LDP in the mid-1990s saw the near collapse of that party, Komeito
was on the way to recovery less than a year later. This was less due to a
change in policies, although they had sharpened and showed less considera-
tion of the LDP s position, than because its supporters could show that one

year later Komeito

'

s policy proposals were proving to be rather well thought
through. The media did not recognise this but supporters did and were able to
convince a signi

'

cant number of the people they canvassed that this was the
case. The media are likely to continue to write little about Komeito s policies,

which is on the one hand the destiny of a third party, and on the other the
destiny of a party perceived to be seeking power to protect a religious orga-
nisation. At the national level, support for the party is primarily due to the
e

'

ort of active Soka Gakkai members who canvass for Komeito and thereby
raise awareness and engage in discussions about what Komeito stands for.
Still the national election of 2010 was clearly a much easier campaign for
Komeito supporters than had been the election of 2009, or previous elections.
Out of its LDP coalition-dominated position, with new attractive Komeito
leadership and candidates, and with Minshut - ' s policy proposals failing, it