Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
status as housewife may continue to be the best way to legitimate her position
as a politician, although we also see more younger female unmarried and
married politicians who attract voters through their professional careers. One
such example of a Komeito politician standing for of
ce in 2010 will be given
in more detail in Chapter 5 .
Still in 2004, assumptions about what voters expected were clearly visible
from televised election campaign ads. Most young female politicians, if mar-
ried, will make sure that their potential supporters see them having made
adequate arrangements for childcare and other domestic duties by demon-
strating how their mothers (never their husbands or fathers) stepped in during
their absence. In contrast, their male counterparts projected a youthful image
(a particularly important theme in the 2003 and 2004 national elections) by
showing how they manage to squeeze in sessions at the gym despite their busy
schedule (Okada Katsuya, NHK TV programme showing candidates of the
2003 Lower House election). The housewife identity for older females in their
fifties may therefore be a good platform, if not a necessary one for most, from
which to launch their political career, being perceived to have done their
domestic (or national)
s
direct representation in politics remains relatively low. Female members of the
Lower House made up just over 7% in 2003 (which rose to about 11% in
2009). 4 Female Upper House members and local assembly members make up
just over 14%. Komeito was somewhat above the average, with 13% in the
Lower House and 21% in the Upper House, and 28% of local assembly
members (some 880 out of almost 3,200, then). Most of these were assembled
at the meeting described above, but unlike their male counterparts, who had
without exception been in paid employment prior to becoming politicians,
they had mostly been housewives. Of course, having this status does not mean
that they are at home cleaning the house the whole day; in fact, the opposite
has more clearly been the case.
Current gender practices and organisational structures in Soka Gakkai
mostly contribute to a typical middle-class gender socialisation, a way of life
that is still seen as an ideal and a sign of prosperity for many also within Soka
Gakkai. There are clear generational di
'
duty
'
,
including having raised children. Women
'
erences in the rise of prosperity
compared to previous generations, when most Soka Gakkai members came
from poorer economic backgrounds. Class di
erences among the university
students I interviewed could also be seen. Young women with fathers from a
'
background all had mothers who worked. On the other hand,
young women from a middle-class background with fathers working as
blue-collar
'
'
white-
collar
workers, especially academics, all had mothers who were housewives.
Since the Buddhist concept of karma as preached in Soka Gakkai is regarded
as changing deeply embedded cultural and social practices, is their resistance
to deeply embedded gender practices then to avoid culture becoming destiny
(Butler 1990)? If women do not always desire di
'
erent gender roles, is change
possible while maintaining the desirable
qualities that are much
more likely to develop from being in a social position of care (Gilligan 1993)?
'
feminine
'
 
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