A case of interpretation? - Religion and Politics in Contemporary Japan - page 129

as a badge of honour, given that such criticism often comes from right-wing
and pro t-driven directions with which they disagree. Mass-media criticism of

Komeito tends not to be about policies but about its religious connections. It
is assumed that Ikeda is a de facto power house behind Komeito, which is
perhaps not surprising given that he founded the party, and has for so long in
the tabloids been portrayed as corrupt and power-hungry. As we saw pre-
viously, what also makes religion an easy target is the link between old
memories about religion and state power. The power that Ikeda enjoys is one
of the most singled-out criticisms of Soka Gakkai in relation to politics. This
is arguably understandable given the fact that he has access to and in

uences
the thinking of millions of young people. Yet, such criticism tends to
strengthen a sense of purpose for Soka Gakkai members, especially as it
always increases during elections. This has become a more or less expected
pattern. Moreover, politicians regularly criticise each other during a contest
for political power, while after an election, as one Komeito politician told me,
everyone gets on with running their constituency, which inevitably means
cooperation between people from di erent parties.

Criticism of Soka Gakkai and its spiritual leader was much more likely to
motivate supporters to work harder to seek support

for Komeito, than

undermine it. For example, in January 2004 an a ray broke out between the

then Minshut - leader, Kan Naoto, who criticised Komeito and Soka Gakkai
by saying that the coalition government was being held in a

' '

choke hold , and

' '

that politics in Japan had become hostage to a single religious group (Asahi

fired back by reminding the Minshut - leader
that this had not seemed to be a problem when Kan had expressed his desire
to enter into a coalition with Komeito at Minshut -

Shinbun, 15/01/2004). Kanzaki

s national convention in
1998. While for politicians such comments and insinuations may be part of
outmanoeuvring political opponents, for supporters it creates a lack of trust
towards the intentions of other parties and politicians outside Komeito. Yet,
in policy terms, supporters saw Komeito and Minshut - more in line, and
some said that they would prefer a coalition with Minshut - . Such criticism
based on religious insinuations undermined trust in other parties, just as it
had done in previous years with the LDP. Yet, a coalition with the LDP in a
sense was easier because supporters

'

(see
Chapter 2 ) who the LDP is. Supporters knew that most LDP politicians only
accepted Komeito because they had to win elections; they knew that there
were some, in their eyes,

' knew ' , just as Masaya ' knew '

LDP politicians, but also that there were
many who have a right-wing, nationalistic political agenda with which they
disagree. Moreover, and very importantly, the LDP had real grassroots power
whereas Minshut - had few local politicians in 2003 and 2004, while these
increased in the years to come. Local-level politicians and local-level support
groups were clearly felt to be key strengths in the 2010 election, as will be
discussed in Chapter 5.
Contrary to the portrayal in the magazine Sekai, Komeito sharing power
with the LDP was less a matter of liking or agreeing with their policies than it

' good '