Geography Reference
In-Depth Information
The dilemma facing them had no clear answer and it was in the end a
matter of making a decision to either support or withdraw support. Most of
these young people decided that although they would have liked the party to
state more candidly their opposition to the war, they also considered this in
light of the international response to the crisis. When countries such as
France and Germany could not stop the war, could Komeito, with few inter-
national diplomatic connections, realistically be expected to do so? This was
in the end judged to be the reality of the situation. Knowledge about the dif-
ficulties of stopping the war and the trust they had in many Komeito politi-
cians was what made them continue their support for the party. As Nami
summed up one evening, most people who she knew were worried about what
Komeito was doing because the political engagement with the LDP was not
transparent:
Supporters learn about the result later, but do not see how a
particular conclusion is reached.
'
In the end, most young supporters cast
aside their doubts and believed that in this way at least Komeito was still able
to have some sort of impact on political decision-making. Both Hiromi and
Tobi, as outspoken critics of the war, continued to support Komeito and even
defended the party when explaining the situation to their fellow students and
friends outside Soka Gakkai. While they themselves might have liked
Komeito to have stood its ground and insisted on a UN resolution, Komeito
was their best hope in the political world among the choices they felt they
had. If they had decided not to continue their support, it might have under-
mined their fellow Soka Gakkai members
'
'
'
trust in their
political objectives and the possibility of attaining them. It was young sup-
porters
, and their friends
political commitment that made them want to continue supporting
the party in which they believed, despite the predicament of doing so. Rather
than simply in-group loyalty, to have a political say they knew they needed
not only political representatives, but also continued collective action, however
circumscribed at times.
On 22 June 2004 Komeito stated at a press conference at the Japanese Press
Club that their stance on the war in Iraq had always been to seek a UN
resolution and that they had made e
'
orts to obtain that. As that was not
forthcoming and considering the interest of Japan
its relation with the USA,
the threat of North Korea, what was perceived at the time as helping the
stability in the Middle East, and also Japan
-
they had
decided to support the Koizumi administration. In the Yomiuri Shinbun (the
newspaper supporting the LDP) on the same day there was an article about
Japan
'
s dependency on oil
-
s impending food crisis. 4 Komeito had been emphasising this theme as
a way of showing that if Japan were to actually have a more independent
foreign policy, it would have to become more independent in its basic ability
to support itself. Komeito was then vowing to raise Japan
'
s independent food
production from the current 40% to 50%. The day after this press conference
I met Tobi and some other UNRC members for lunch. I asked Tobi if he had
changed his opinion concerning Komeito
'
'
s stance on the war in Iraq since he
'
'
had
first expressed his opposition to me in December 2003.
Not really
, and
 
Search WWH ::




Custom Search