Aspiration for the good society - Religion and Politics in Contemporary Japan - page 101

Soka Gakkai friend, ' For never asking me to vote again ' , which she felt was

' respecting ' her. Masaya continued to elaborate on her impression of Komeito:

' You know, what I am really afraid of is state and religion becoming one. Like

Japan has a history of that

. Later she told me that she had voted for the LDP
in the proportional representation constituency because she wanted Koizumi
(the then prime minister) to stay.

'

I like him and he has done a good job, I
have nothing to complain about with regards to the LDP being the ruling
party.

'

At the same time, she had not voted for any regional candidate
because,

'

.
When considering Soka Gakkai in light of it being one of the few groups
that opposed Japan

' I don ' t know any '

s military regime, it seems somewhat incongruous that
fear of a repeat of Japan

'

s fusion of politics with religion gave rise to the
suspicion, not of the LDP as previous inheritors of that past regime, but of
Soka Gakkai in its support for Komeito. This deliberate blurring of historical
facts, so easily hitched onto in the public sphere where religion or its rela-
tionship to politics are not discussed, but only brought into bearing in a
defamatory way by the tabloid or sh - kanshi genre, results in fear being stirred
up about a historical repeat, easily creating sensationalism. It is also very
pro

'

table. More serious is that the political and religious illegitimacy that
hang over popular religious movements such as Soka Gakkai do not get dis-
cussed and as a result mask these more insidious media and political forces.
Linking a fatal past and representations of memories in the present are part
of hiding the real media

' '

(see Gamble and Watanabe 2004) within
such seemingly polemical issues as concern with a fusion of religion and state.
While this is serious, and it obscures processes of grassroots democratic par-
ticipation, it does not only have a negative outcome for Komeito. It largely
serves to strengthen Soka Gakkai members

atrocities

motivation to increase their
support for Komeito, which comes to be seen as even more important in
order to secure proper governance. Their many conversations with friends and
relatives, despite being mostly about support for Komeito, also confront these
nationalist and reactionary trends of particular tabloids. Do these reactionary
tendencies make it more di

'

cult to widen support for a party with otherwise
important political objectives? Yes, undoubtedly, but as I listened to suppor-
ters phone calls that would last from a few minutes stammering out their

hope that the person they called might consider voting for Komeito, to con-
versations half an hour long delving into long discussions on policies and the
current political situation, their e

'

ected not
only the belief that Komeito was a progressive party for social change, but the
importance of becoming a more progressive society as a whole.
Yet it is also clear that with Komeito in the coalition, supporters found
themselves in the midst of public debates on current issues such as the min -
problem. While what appeals to Soka Gakkai members is moderate, hard-
working politicians with a focus on welfare and a clear perception of the
common good that addresses wider humanitarian and social concerns, real-
politik is clearly, as expected, contentious. However,

orts to have conversations re

it also raises new