The UK Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 79

in the world or to take over the country as a “going concern” with its in-
dustry intact. Other committee members had dismissed these ideas as un-
likely while the UK remained within NATO. The DRC had, nonetheless,
expressed the view that tactical use of BW in a limited war was increas-
ingly feasible, with new combinations of agents able to produce effects
within four hours. Hence, the committee reported: “The tactical value of
BW may thus be greater than was previously thought, and it may be that,
irrespective of doubts about the likelihood of strategic attack against this
country, MRE's work on defensive measures should nevertheless con-
tinue on account of this tactical possibility.” 130
At around this time the Joint Intelligence Committee also reported that
the “likelihood of a full scale BW attack on the UK is small...although
the Russians possess a delivery capability, their preparations appear to be
defensive rather than offensive.” 131 This view was supported in an earlier
review of the BW program, which noted that a BW attack was feasible
but unlikely because “it is difficult to see convincing military or political
motives for such an attack.” 132
A later note to the minister of defense carried these assessments for-
ward, explaining that the UK continued to adhere to the Geneva Protocol
and would not initiate chemical or biological warfare. With respect to re-
taliation, the author noted that there were no plans to retaliate in kind
against a biological attack, and although the previous Conservative gov-
ernment had sanctioned research on a limited chemical retaliatory ca-
pability, the prime minister had since maintained a “masterly silence”
on the subject. The author did, however, endorse research for “passive
defence.” With this in mind, the memorandum recommended that the
Ministry of Defence should “try and shift the main load of running it
[MRE] onto someone else's back—the Medical Research Council, or the
Minister of Health, or the Department of Education and Science...Isug-
gest our slogan should be 'out of the MRE by 1970.'” 133
This view was endorsed by Roy Mason, minister of defense for equip-
ment, who argued that although the MRE could be shifted to civil depart-
ments, the decision needed to be made in the light of the spread “of
knowledge about chemical and biological warfare among middle-class
Powers who will quite soon be able to arm themselves with highly effec-
tive weapons of this sort at a fraction of the cost in money or facilities of a
nuclear armoury.” 134