The UK Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 78

downwind as the simulated biological attack spread over southern Eng-
land. 124 Scientists drew various conclusions from this series of trials—pri-
marily, that E. coli survived better when airborne in large particles than in
small ones. 125
The later trials also employed a new technique that involved “micro-
threads” made from spider's web to hold the microorganisms during
studies of their viability in a simulated airborne state. 126 Alongside the
spraying trials, sets of E. coli held on microthreads were exposed to the at-
mosphere in exposed and sheltered sites. The scientists concluded that E.
coli on microthreads survived better than airborne cells. Even with this
disparity, they argued that the microthread technique was still in better
agreement with field results than laboratory methods for estimating sur-
vival. 127
Prudent Preparation or Expensive Insurance?
Throughout these trials, BW policy remained unchanged, despite a
change to a Labour government in 1964. A note from the secretary of
state for war to Prime Minister Harold Wilson in November 1965 con-
firmed that policy, inherited from the previous government, was to de-
velop defensive measures. 128 By February 1967, and with a review of de-
fense expenditure R&D under way, the prime minister had not replied to
the memorandum. At this stage, one of the successor committees to the
DPRC, the Defence Research Committee (DRC), decided to allow the re-
view to run its course before returning to the prime minister. With the
MRE employing 120 staff and costing around £1 million per year, the es-
tablishment was a prime target for possible defense cuts. A Ministry of
Defence briefing note reported that the DRC was convinced that BW
could be made and stored easily and cheaply. On the other hand, the
committee “was divided on its views about the likelihood of an attack
and was therefore unable to reach a decision about the whether the work
of the MRE should be regarded as a thoroughly prudent preparation for a
real danger or as a rather expensive insurance against a remote contin-
gency.” 129
Members of the committee had argued that an enemy might regard
BW as more humane than nuclear warfare, adding that BW might also be
used either to divert attention to internal matters from events elsewhere