Biology Reference
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ity.”
107
The changed situation was, however, noted in a Joint Planning
Staff report on CBW that drew together the operational assessments,
Todd's report, and Cawood's synthesis.
Chemical warfare, in particular, fitted the new thinking about a gradu-
ated response to the Soviet threat. According to the Joint Planning Staff,
in a global war “CW could be an effective means of delaying the enemy
in a period before nuclear weapons are used. Although tactical nuclear
weapons might be more effective in producing delay, there is risk of esca-
lation. We agree that the use of CW might well keep the battle under con-
trol and provide a means of delaying the enemy and gaining time for ne-
gotiations.”
108
Moreover, CW were envisaged as having the potential to prevent esca-
lation from limited to global war in areas such as Southeast Asia, because
CW were deemed more “politically acceptable” than tactical nuclear
weapons. In the final amendments to the report, the recommendation on
CW read: “Further study is required of the tactical employment of lethal
and incapacitating CW agents in a global war in Europe before nuclear
weapons are used and their possible subsequent use in conjunction with
nuclear weapons.”
109
BW, on the other hand, were taken to be more of a threat than an op-
portunity. The Joint Planning Staff of the Chiefs of Staff Committee con-
ceded that BW did have potential in a global war, but CW would be
“more effective in the period preceding the strategic nuclear exchange,
and thereafter attack with either CW or BW would be irrelevant.” In a
limited war, BW might be used as incapacitants or for secret operations,
but once again chemical agents were deemed more effective for these
purposes. Against these possible opportunities, the planning staff consid-
ered that the UK was especially vulnerable to both chemical and biologi-
cal attack because “the United Kingdom may be covered in one attack,
the Sino-Soviet Bloc could not.” Moreover, there was thought to be no
advantage in initiating a biological attack:
Political implications apart, we would not wish to be the first to use BW
against the Soviet Bloc because of the relative vulnerability of this coun-
try should they retaliate strategically against the United Kingdom. How-
ever, we agree with the DRPC that there should be increased research
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