The UK Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 62

ment Policy.” In a draft version, which clearly drew on the March assess-
ment of biological warfare, the Defence Committee was asked to agree on
a threefold research policy: “Research and trials to determine the true
risk of biological warfare should be continued; Research to establish the
best defensive measures should be continued; offensive research should
be concentrated mainly on the study of long range possibilities.” 55
Despite, or possibly because of, these developments during 1952, the
details of policy remained far from clear at all levels of discussion. The sci-
entific advisors, in particular, felt ostracized by secrecy. Fildes reported to
the BRAB that he had been involved in disagreements with Ministry of
Supply officials, which he attributed to his “lack of knowledge of chang-
ing policies.” 56 In response, the chief scientist at the Ministry of Supply,
Owen Wansbrough-Jones, pointed out that the Chiefs of Staff were not
scientists, and so could “give broad direction only and had agreed on a
policy that research and trials to determine the true risk of BW should be
continued, the best defensive measures should be established, and that
we should concentrate mainly on the study of long range offensive possi-
bilities.” 57
Here, the chief scientist was simply quoting the Chiefs of Staff recom-
mendations from earlier in the year, and which were condensed into a
formal directive on biological warfare a few months later. BRAB mem-
bers approved the directive in February 1953, although the minister of
supply, Duncan Sandys, had not yet commented on it. Matters were com-
plicated because Sandys was also preparing his own general directive on
BW policy. 58 By June, however, the Chiefs of Staff directive, which had
not been altered further, reached a stage where no major modification by
any of the advisory committees was expected before it was approved at
ministerial level.
The minister of supply issued his separate directive on BW research in
November 1953, and although much of its content appeared to consoli-
date the various deliberations from the previous year, there were some
significant changes of emphasis. 59 Certainly, the directive had not gained
a particularly easy passage past the Chiefs of Staff. In July a draft version
suffered delays as doubts were expressed in various departments about its
“timing and suitability.” 60 Another draft was issued in August and a few
months later was submitted to the Cabinet Defence Committee for ap-
proval. From the Admiralty perspective, the new draft had successfully