The UK Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 61

flict, the Chiefs of Staff formulated an extensive strategy review at the be-
hest of a new Conservative government. 51 War, they judged, would most
likely be a short and intense affair, and all preparations outlined in the
document were geared toward this possibility. 52 All WMD remained as
likely deterrents, but now a greater emphasis was placed on nuclear de-
terrence, though without neglecting the additional role of conventional
forces.
BW still featured as an integral part of this new strategy, but was now
no longer on a par with nuclear weaponry. In March 1952, a month be-
fore their serious deliberations for a new Global Strategy Paper com-
menced, the Chiefs of Staff issued a detailed appraisal of biological war-
fare. In it they noted that British research had attempted primarily to
gauge the danger of biological warfare. The US researchers, on the other
hand, were being pushed toward offensive research, weapon develop-
ment in particular. The report predicted that a strategic germ weapon
with “uncertain capabilities” would be available to the US Air Force
within a year. A number of suggestions for British policy were also made.
First, resources should be devoted to the “immediate defensive prob-
lems” facing civil defense and the military services in the UK. Next, some
appreciation should be made of the “military and strategic consequences
of the probable United States weapons.” A third proposition was to “di-
minish our effort on short term offensive problems but we should
strengthen them on research aimed at very long range offensive possibili-
ties.” Finally, research should be directed at “learning all we can of the ul-
timate dangers of BW, and dealing with short and long term defensive
measures.” 53
When the Global Strategy Paper was issued in June, the Chiefs of Staff
adopted a strong retaliatory position on biological and chemical warfare:
“The Allies should not take up a position which would deprive them of
the ability to use Bacteriological Warfare or Chemical Warfare in retalia-
tion, if such were to their advantage.” 54
Yet despite this endorsement, the emphasis in British defense policy
was now firmly on nuclear deterrence. And, with the first British atomic
bomb tested in October 1952, the importance of biological warfare in de-
fense policy began to decline. In the wake of the Global Strategy Paper,
the Chiefs of Staff drafted a thorough report for the Cabinet Defence
Committee on “Biological and Chemical Warfare Research and Develop-