The UK Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 52

by this type of bomb: “It has been estimated that approximately 200 tons
of this type of bomb would be required to cover an industrial city of 100
square miles in order to produce a 50 per cent risk of death. This figure is
based on the assumption that each individual weapon produces a 50 per
cent risk of death over a square mile of city.” 20
Advisors on the BRAB initially rejected this specification for an anti-
personnel bomb. These scientists, including Paul Fildes, who had left
Porton to return to civilian work, were skeptical that a workable bomb
could be produced by the target date, which the initial request had set as
1951. Describing the achievements of the N-bomb and cattle cake as
“war-time expedients,” they argued that the postwar program should be
stepped up if it was to make any significant progress.
By October 1947 the requirement for a biological bomb had been refor-
mulated. Both the chemical and biological bombs from the previous re-
quests had been rolled into a single requirement, OR/1065, for a strategic
toxic weapon. Without now specifying a chemical or biological agent,
the weapon was still intended to cause “widespread incapacitation of
the workers” and produce “maximum adverse effects on morale.” 21 The
Air Staff wanted either a single weapon that could take different fillings
or two different weapons. A weapon developed with alternative fillings
would, they hoped, be able to induce temporary incapacitation or pro-
duce a high percentage of deaths or permanent disability. The target was
specifically intended to be personnel in industrial areas but would also in-
clude pockets of resistance and lines of communication. 22 Alternatively,
two different weapons could be produced, with priority going to an inca-
pacitating weapon. A lower-priority, lethal weapon would target places
such as nuclear plants, armament centers, and research establishments in
order to kill skilled personnel.
“A Complementary Weapon”
With OR/1065 in place, and with equal priority accorded to nuclear and
biological warfare research, the Chiefs of Staff began to discuss the role of
the putative bioweapon as a complement to nuclear weapons. Attempts
were made within the Air Ministry to predict the effects of the two weap-
ons and to make some sort of comparison between them. The architects
of these exercises acknowledged, however, that there existed “no defin-