The UK Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 50

year after the directive was issued, the Chiefs of Staff had decided on a
broad program of research maintaining the same policy rationale: “at the
time it was emphasised that for the successful development of defensive
measures it was essential to study the offensive field.” 10
Following the highly secretive and largely word-of-mouth arrange-
ments of the war, a far more formalized web of advisory committees was
quickly established in the immediate postwar period to oversee biological
warfare research and policy. The three key committees were:
• Biological Research Advisory Board (BRAB). Independent scientists pro-
viding technical advice to Porton Down and also passing on technical ad-
vice and information to other committees.
• Chiefs of Staff Biological Warfare Sub-Committee (BWS). Until April
1947, the Inter-Services Sub-Committee on Biological Warfare (ISSBW).
Discussed and formulated offensive and defensive policy on biological
warfare.
• Defence Research Policy Committee (DRPC). Scientists and Services rep-
resentatives responsible for balancing priorities across the board in de-
fense research. 11
Within these new decision-making and advisory structures, links were
soon made between biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. In 1946
the Cabinet Defence Committee of the Atlee government had secretly
committed Britain to independent acquisition of a nuclear bomb, a move
intended to maintain Britain's status as a leading global player. Yet, as in-
creasing US reluctance to share nuclear secrets culminated in outright re-
fusal, embodied in the August 1946 McMahon Act, it is unsurprising that
the Chiefs of Staff also considered a serious future for both chemical and
biological warfare.
In this respect, BW policy was soon incorporated within more general
defense policy that recognized deterrence as a key element. In July 1947
the Chiefs of Staff agreed on “a cardinal principle of policy to be prepared
to use weapons of mass destruction. The knowledge of this preparedness
is the best deterrent to war in peace-time.” 12 WMD were specified as nu-
clear, biological, and chemical weapons, and BW enjoyed equal priority
with nuclear weapons. A month earlier the DRPC had recommended
that “research on chemical and biological weapons should be given prior-
ity effectively equal to that given to the study of atomic [weapons].” 13