The US Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 46

grams had to compete with other military programs. Although a high
point was reached in the Kennedy-Johnson era, the progress was never
felt to be sufficient. Complaints regarding US BW unpreparedness contin-
ued. Because no firm priority was assigned to the CBW program, atten-
tion to it tended to fluctuate, often driven by intelligence perceptions of
what the “enemy” was doing.
Why were the results of the BW program so meager, measured by its
advocates' predictions? There are several reasons. First, the use of BW
would summon unpredictable consequences, making them an undesir-
able means of waging war. Second, the program was never given the
priority it needed to produce a fully developed weapon system. Third,
the moral revulsion against the use of BW could not be fully exorcized.
Fourth, BW were redundant at best when compared with other WMD.
Fifth, the rationale for developing BW capability was unpersuasive to any
nation armed with nuclear weapons. The BW effort was based on an
Achilles' heel theory: any weakness in a nation's armor could give the
enemy a fatal advantage. But military strength depends upon overall
command of superior means: munitions availability, production facilities,
means of delivery, training, organization, morale, mobilization and de-
ployment ability. The overall balance of force is what counts in war, not
single weapon systems.
Having looked at the offensive BW program within a historical context,
we are faced repeatedly with the question that haunts all arms programs:
Should we build up a military capability against a hypothetical threat
that may never materialize? Was the offensive BW program necessary?
Within the logic of the program itself and contemporary fears about the
intentions of other countries, yes. Indeed, the effort was imperative. But
within a broader context of international security, perhaps not. Defensive
BW preparations are, of course, necessary, and it is impossible to separate
offensive from defensive preparedness completely. But we should reflect
on the sense of pursuing what amounted to an ultra kill capability. Con-
temporary scenarios envisioned the use of BW as an accompaniment or
follow-up to nuclear attacks; the population of a country struck by nu-
clear weapons would be highly vulnerable to infectious diseases. But
what purpose would be served? Mere slaughter is not strategy.