The US Biological Weapons Program - Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945 - page 45

supporting information. We end as we began in our consideration of the
effectiveness of intelligence on BW: in speculation, ambiguity, and uncer-
tainty.
Organization
The CBW advocates never had the kind of leverage they needed to de-
velop an adequate BW program. The CmlC remained a division of the
Army. This arrangement hindered the emergence of priority for the pro-
gram that would have allowed it to fulfill expectations. Moreover, the ad-
vocates of BW tended to see their program in isolation, not as a compo-
nent within the entire weapons program. Finally, CBW was never fully
integrated into either military doctrine or forces. Military men generally
did not feel comfortable with these weapons.
War Plans and Doctrine
What does a nation do with CBW if it builds up its capabilities? The un-
certain assessments of the value of BW and the often-inconclusive intelli-
gence estimates of enemy preparedness complicated the making of war
plans that integrated CBW into doctrine and forces. Gauging the accu-
racy and the effect of BW was more problematic than estimating the de-
structive effects of nuclear weapons. From the discussions regarding their
use, it is obvious that they were seen more as a strategic than a tactical
weapon system. Moreover, no war has been won by CBW. Claims that
these weapons could tilt the balance in a future conflict were hypotheti-
cal constructs.
Preparedness
Because BW agents had not been used in military operations, uncertainty
and unpredictability haunted all preparedness efforts. Certainly, progress
was made in CBW preparedness between 1945 and 1969. What kept the
preparedness program going was organizational dynamics: the CmlC kept
pressing it. Moreover, during the Truman and Eisenhower administra-
tions, fiscal constraints curtailed spending on arms. There was a momen-
tary spurt of increased funding during the Korean War, but CBW pro-